HUMANE NATURE:

Or,

The fundamental Elements

OF

POLICY.

BEING

A diſcovery of the *Faculties*, *Acts* and *Paſſions* of the

SOUL of MAN,

from their original cauſes;

According to ſuch

PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES

as are not commonly known or aſſerted.

The ſecond Edition,

Augmented and much corrected by the Authors own Hand.

By THO. HOBBES of *Malmsbury.*

London, Printed by *T. Newcomb* for *Francis Bowman* of Oxon, 1651.

To the Right Honorable,

WILLIAM

Earl of NEWCASTLE,
Governour to the Prince
his Highneſs, One of
His Majeſties moſt
Honorable Privie
Councel.

My moſt Honoured Lord,

FRom the principal parts of Nature, Reaſon and Paſſion, have proceeded

two kindes of Learning, *Mathematical* and *Dogmatical*: the former is free from Controverſie and Diſpute, becauſe it conſiſteth in comparing Figure and Motion onely; in which things, *Truth*, and *the intereſt of men*, oppoſe not each other: but in the other there is nothing undiſputable, becauſe it compareth men, and medleth with their Right and profit; in which

which, as oft as Reason is against a man, so oft will a man be against Reason. And from hence it cometh, that they who have written of Justice and Policie in general, do all invade each other and themselves with contradictions. To reduce this Doctrine to the Rules and Infallibility of Reason, there is no way but, first, put such Principles down for a Foundation, as Passion

not miſtruſting, may not ſeek to diſplace; aud afterwards to build thereon the truth of Caſes in the law of Nature (which hitherto have been built in the Air) by degrees, till the whole have been inexpugnable. Now, my Lord, the Principles fit for ſuch a Foundation, are thoſe which heretofore I have acquainted your Lordſhip withal in private diſcourſe, and which by your Com-

command I have here put into a Method. To examine Caſes thereby between *Soveraign* and *Soveraign*, or between *Soveraign* and *Subject*, I leave to them that ſhall finde leaſure and encouragement thereto: for my part, I preſent this to your Lordſhip for the true and onely Foundation of ſuch Science. For the Stile, it is therefore the worſe, becauſe, whilſt I was writing, I conſult-

ed

ed more with Logick then with Rhetorick: But for the Doctrin, it is not ſlightly proved; and the Concluſions thereof of ſuch nature, as, for want of them, Government and Peace have been nothing elſe, to this day, but mutual Fears: And it would be an incomparable benefit to common-wealth, that every one held the opinion concerning *Law* and *Policie* here delivered. The ambi-

ambition therefore of this Book, in seeking by your Lo^ps countenance to insinuate it self with those whom the matter it containeth most neerly concerneth, is to be excused. For my self, I desire no greater honour then I enjoy already in your Lordships favour, unless it be that you would be pleased, in continuance thereof, to give me more exercise in your commands; which,

which, as I am bound by your many great favours, I ſhall obey, being

My moſt honoured Lord,

Your moſt humble,

and moſt obliged

ſervant,

May 9. 1640. THO. HOBBS.

TO

To the READER.

READER,

IT was thought good to let you know that *Mr.* Hobbs *hath written a body of Phi-*

Philoſophy, upon ſuch Principles and in ſuch Order as are uſed by men converſant in Demonſtration: this he hath diſtinguiſhed into 3. Parts; De corpore, de Homine, de Cive; *each of the Conſequents beginning at the end of the Antecedent, and inſiſting thereupon, as the*

the latter books of Euclid *upon the former. The last of these he hath already published in Latine beyond the Seas; the second is this now presented: and if these two receive justice in the world, there is hopes we may obtain the first: He whose care it is, and labour,*

to

to ſatisfie the judgement *and* reaſon *of Mankinde, will condeſcend ſo far (we hope) to ſatisfie the* deſire *of thoſe learned men whom theſe ſhall either have found or made; which cannot be, until they ſhall Analytically have followed the grand* Phænomena

of

of States and Kingdoms thorow the Paſſions of particular men, into the Elemental Principles of naturall and corporeal motions. The former Work was publiſhed by the Author, and ſo is out of danger; this by a friend, with leave from him: and to ſecure this, you

are

are intreated to consider the relations wherein it stands, especially to the Book de Cive. *It was thought a part of Religion, not to make any change without the Authors advice, which could not suddenly be obtained; and so it comes forth innocently, supposing*

nothing

nothing to have happened ſince the Dedication of it; which if it ſeem a ſolœciſm to ſome, it may to others give ſatisfaction, in calling to mind thoſe times and opportunities to which we are indebted for thoſe admirable Compoſitions.

F. B.

IN

Libellum præstantissimi,

Tho. Hobbii

Veri verè Philosophi, de Naturâ Hominis.

Quæ magna Cœli *mœnia, & tractæ,* (Maris;
Terræq; *fines siquid aut ultra est, capit*
Mens *ipsa tandem capitur:* Omnia *hactenus*
Quæ nôsse potuit, nota jam primùm est Sibi.
Accede, Lector, *disce quis demùm sies;*
Tranquilinam jecoris agnoscas tui, (cul.
Quî propiùs *hæret nil tibi, & nil tam* pro-
Non hîc Scholarum frivola, aut cassi logâ,
Quales per annos fortè plus septem legit
Ut folle pleno prodeat, Rixæ Artifex;
Vanasq; merces futili linguâ crepet,
Sed sancta Rerum pondera, & sensus graves;
Quales parari decuit, ipsa cùm fuit
Pingenda Ratio, *& vindici suo adstitit.*

Pan-

Panduntur omnes Machinæ gyri tuæ,
Animæq; Vectes, Trochleæ, Cunei, Rotæ;
Quâ concitetur arte, quo sufflamine
Sistatur illa rursus, & constet sibi:
Nec, si Fenestram pectori humano suam
Aptâsset ipse Momus, *inspiceret magis.*
Hîc cerno levia Affectuum vestigia,
Gracilesq; Sensûs lineas; video quibus
Vehantur alis blanduli Cupidines,
Quibusq; stimulis urgeant Iræ graves.
Hîc & Dolores & Voluptates suos
Produnt recessus, ipse nec Timor latet.
Has nôrit artes quisquis in foro velit
Animorum habenas flectere, & populos cupit
Aptis ligatos nexibus jungi sibi.
Hîc Archimedes *publicus figat pedem*
Siquando regna machinis politicis
Urgere satagit, & feras gentes ciet,
Imisq; motum sedibus mundum quatit:
Facilè domabit cuncta, qui Menti imperat.
Consul or audax, & Promethæi *potens*
Facinoris Anime! quis tibi dedit Deus
Hæc intueri sæculis longè abdita,
Oculosq; luce tinxit ambrosiâ tuos?
Tu mentis omnis, at Tuæ nulla est capax.
Hâc laude Solus fruere: Divinum est opus
Animam Creare; proximum huic, Ostendere.

RAD. BATHURST, A.M.
Col. Trin. *Oxon*

Humane Nature:

OR,

The Fundamental Elements OF POLICY.

THE true and perſpicuous explication of the Elements of *Lawes Natural and Politick* (*which is my preſent ſcope*) dependeth upon the knowledge of what is *humane Nature*, what is *body*

Cap. *politick* & what it is we cal a *law*; concerning which Points, as the *Writings* of men from Antiquity down-wards have ſtill increaſed, ſo alſo have the *Doubts* and *Controverſies* concerning the ſame: And ſeeing that true knowledge begetteth not Doubt nor controverſie but knowledge, it is manifeſt from the preſent Controverſies, That they which have *heretofore* written thereof, have not well underſtood their own Subject.

2. *Harme* I can do none, though I erre no leſs then they; for I ſhall leave men but as they are, in Doubt & Diſpute: but, intending not to take any Principle upon *truſt*, but only to put men in mind of what they *know already*, or *may know* by their own experience, I hope to erre the leſs; and when I do, it muſt proceed from too *haſty concluding*, which

which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid. 1

3. On the other side, if *reasoning aright* winne not *consent*, which may very easily happen, from them that being confident of their own knowledge weigh not what is said, the *fault* is not mine, but theirs; for as it is my part to *shew* my Reasons, so it is theirs to bring *attention*.

4. Mans *Nature* is the *summe of his natural faculties and Powers*, as the Faculties of *Nutrition*, *Motion*, *Generation*, *Sense*, *Reason*, *&c.* These powers we do unanimously call *Natural*, and are contained in the definition of man, under these words, *Animal* and *Rational*.

5. According to the two principal parts of man, I divide his Faculties into two sorts, Faculties of the *Body*, and Faculties of the *Mind*.

Cap. 6. Since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the *Body* is nothing necessary to the present purpose, I will only summe them up in these Three heads, power *Nutritive*, power *Motive*, and power *Generative*.

7 Of the powers of the *Mind* there be two sorts, *Cognitive*, *Imaginative*, or *Conceptive* and *Motive*; and first of *Cognitive*.

For the understanding of what I mean by the power *Cognitive*, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our Minds continually certain *Images* or conceptions of the things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the World annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the *Image* thereof; and all those things which he had before

before ſeen or perceived in it; every one by his own experience knowing, that the *abſence* or *deſtruction* of things once imagined doth not cauſe the *abſence* or *deſtruction* of the *Imagination* it ſelf; This *Imagerie* and *repreſentations* of the qualities of the thing without, is that we call our *Conception, Imagination, Ideas, notice* or *knowledge* of them; and the *Faculty* or power by which we are capable of ſuch knowledge, is that I here call *Cognitive power*, or *Conceptive*, the power of knowing or conceiving. 1.

CHAP. II.

2. *Definition of Senſe.*
4. *Four Propoſitions concerning the nature of Conceptions.*
5. *The Firſt proved.*
6. *The Second proved.*
7. 8. *The Third proved.*
9. *The Fourth proved.*
10. *The main Deception of Senſe.*

1 HAving declared what I mean by the word *Conception*, and other words equivalent thereunto, I come to the *Conceptions* themſelves, to ſhew their *differences*, their *cauſes*, and the *manner of the production*, ſo far as is neceſſary for this place.

2 Originally all *Conceptions* pro-

proceed from the *Action* of the thing it ſelf, whereof it is the Conception: Now when the Action is *preſent*, the Conception it produceth is alſo called *Senſe*; and the thing by whoſe Action the ſame is produced, is called the *object of the Senſe*. 2.

3. By our ſeveral *Organs* we have ſeveral *Conceptions* of ſeveral Qualities in the Objects; for by *Sight* we have a Conception or Image compoſed of *Colour* and *Figure*, which is all the notice and knowledge the Object imparteth to us of its nature by the Eye. By *Hearing* we have a Conception called *Sound*, which is all the knowledge we have of the quality of the Object from the Ear. And ſo the reſt of the Senſes are alſo conceptions of ſeveral qualities, or natures of their Objects.

4 Becauſe the *Image* in Viſi-

on consisting of *Colour* and *Shape* is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the Object of that Sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this Opinion, that the same *Colour* and *Shape* are the *very qualities themselves*; And for the same cause, that *Sound* and *Noise* are the *qualities of the Bell*, or of the Aire. And this Opinion hath been so long received, that the *contrary* must needs appear a great Paradox; and yet the introduction of *Species visible* and *intelligible* (which is necessary for the maintenance of that Opinion) passing to and fro from the *Object*, is *worse* then any Paradox, as being a plain *impossibility*. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these points:

That

That the Subject wherein Colour and Image are inherent, is *not* the *Object* or thing ſeen. 2.

That there is nothing *without us* (really) which we call an *Image* or Colour.

That the ſaid Image or Colour is but an *apparition* unto us of the *Motion*, agitation or alteration which the *Object* worketh in the *Brain*, or ſpirits, or ſome internal ſubſtance of the head.

That as in *Viſion*, ſo alſo in conceptions that ariſe from the *other Senſes*, the ſubject of their *inherence* is not the *Object*, but the *Sentient*.

Every

Cap: 5 Every man hath ſo much experience as to have ſeen the *Sun* and the other viſible Objects by reflection in the *Water* and *Glaſſes*; and this alone is ſufficient for this concluſion, that *Colour* and *Image* may be there where the *thing ſeen* is *not*. But becauſe it may be ſaid that notwithſtanding the *Image* in the water be not in the Object, but a thing meerly *Phantaſtical*, yet there may be *colour* really in the thing it ſelf: I will urge further this experience, That divers times men ſee directly the *ſame* Object *double*, as *two Candles* for *one*, which may happen from diſtemper or otherwiſe without diſtemper if a man will, the Organs being either in their right temper, or equally diſtempered, the *Colours* and *Figures* in two ſuch Images of the ſame thing *cannot be inherent* therein,

in, becauſe the thing ſeen cannot be in *two places*. 2.

One of theſe Images therefore is *not inherent* in the Object: but ſeeing the Organs of the ſight are then in equal temper or diſtemper, the *one* of them is no more inherent then the *other*; and conſequently *neither* of them both are in the Object; which is the firſt Propoſition, mentioned in the precedent number.

6 Secondly, that the Image of any thing by *Reflection* in a *glaſs* or *water* or the like, is *not* any thing *in* or *behind* the Glaſſe, or *in* or *under* the water, every man may grant to himſelf; which is the Second Propoſition.

7 For the Third, we are to conſider, Firſt that every *great agitation* or *concuſſion* of the *Brain* (as it happeneth from a ſtroak, eſpecially if the ſtroak be

Cap. be upon the eye) whereby the Optick nerve ſuffereth any great violence, there *appeareth* before the *eyes* a certain *light*, which light is *nothing without*, but an apparition only, all that is real being the concuſſion or motion of the parts of that Nerve; from which experience we may conclude, That *apparition of light is really nothing but motion* within. If therefore from *lucide bodies* there can be derived *motion* ſo as to affect the Optick Nerve in ſuch manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an *Image* of light ſomewhere in that line by which the motion was laſt derived to the eye; That is to ſay, In the Object, if we look directly on it, and in the Glaſſe or Water, when we look upon it in the line of reflection, which in effect is the Third Propoſition; namely, That Image and

Colour

Colour is but an apparition to us of that motion, agitation, or alteration which the Object worketh in the Brain, or Spirits, or ſome *internal* ſubſtance in the head. 2.

8. But that *from all lucide*, ſhining, and illuminate Bodies, there is a *motion produced* to the eye, and, thorow the eye, to the *Optick* nerve, and ſo into the *Brain*, by which that apparition of *Light* or *Colour* is affected, is not hard to prove. And firſt, it is evident that the *Fire*, the onely lucide body here upon earth, worketh by *motion* equally every way; inſomuch as the motion thereof *ſtopped* or incloſed, it is preſently *extinguiſhed*, and no more Fire. And further, that that motion whereby the Fire worketh, is *dilation* and *contraction* of it ſelf *alternately*, commonly called *ſcintillation* or glowing, is mani-

Cap. manifeſt alſo by experience. From ſuch *motion* in the Fire, muſt needs ariſe a *rejection* or caſting from it ſelf of that part of the *medium* which is *contiguous* to it, whereby that part alſo rejecteth the *next*, and ſo ſucceſſively one part beateth back another to the very *eye*; and in the ſame manner the *exteriour* part of the eye preſſeth the *interiour*, (the Laws of refraction ſtill obſerved.) Now the interiour coat of the Eye is nothing elſe but a piece of the *Optick* nerve; and therefore the motion is ſtill continued thereby into the *Brain*, and by *reſiſtance* or reaction of the Brain, is alſo a *rebound* into the Optick nerve again; which we *not conceiving* as motion or rebound from *within*, do think it is *without*, and call it *light*; as hath been already ſhewed by the

the experience of a ſtroak. We have no reaſon to doubt, that the fountain of Light, the *Sun*, worketh by any otherways then the *Fire*, at leaſt in this matter. And thus all *viſion* hath its Original from ſuch *motion* as is here deſcribed: for where there is no Light, there is no Sight; and therefore *Colour* alſo muſt be the ſame thing with *Light*, as being the effect of the lucide Bodies: their *difference* being onely this, that when the Light cometh *directly* from the Fountain to the Eye, or *indirectly* by reflection from *clean* and *polite* Bodies, and ſuch as have *not* any particular motion internal to alter it, we call it *Light*; but when it cometh to the eye by reflection from *uneven*, *rough*, and coarſe Bodies, (or ſuch as are affected with internal motion of their own that may alter it) 2.

Cap. it) then we call it *Colour*; Colour and Light differing onely in this, that the one is *pure*, and the other *perturbed* Light. By that which hath been said, not onely the truth of the Third Proposition, but also the whole manner of producing Light and Colour, is apparent.

9. As Colour is not inherent in the Object, but an effect thereof upon us, caused by such motion in the Object as hath been described: so neither is *Sound* in the thing we hear, but in our selves. One manifest signe thereof, is, that as a man may *see*, so also he may *hear double* or *treble*, by multiplication of *Ecchoes*, which Ecchoes are sounds as well as the Original; and *not* being in one and the *same place*, cannot be *inherent* in the Body that maketh them: Nothing can make any thing which

which is not in it ſelf: the *Clapper* hath no *ſound* in it, but *motion*, and maketh motion in the internal parts of the Bell; ſo the *Bell* hath motion, and not ſound; that imparteth *motion* to the *Air*, and the *Air* hath motion, but not ſound; the *Air* imparteth motion by the *Ear* and *Nerve* unto the *Brain*; and the Brain hath motion, but not ſound: from the *Brain*, it reboundeth back into the Nerves *outward*, and thence it becometh an *apparition without*, which we call *Sound*. And to proceed to the *reſt* of the *Senſes*, it is apparent enough, that the *Smel* and *Taſte* of the *ſame thing*, are *not* the *ſame* to *every man*, and therefore are *not* in the thing *ſmelt* or *taſted*, but in the *men*. So likewiſe the *heat* we feel from the fire is manifeſtly in *us*, and is quite *different* from the 2.

the heat which is in the *fire*: for *our* heat is *pleaſure* or *pain*, according as it is *great* or *moderate*; but in the *coal* there is no ſuch thing. By this the Fourth and laſt Propoſition is proved, *viz.* That as in viſion, ſo alſo in conceptions that ariſe from *other* ſenſes, the ſubject of their inherence is not in the Object, but in the Sentient.

10. And from hence alſo it followeth, that *whatſoever accidents* or qualities our Senſes make us think there be in the *World*, they be *not* there, but are *ſeeming* and *apparitions* onely: the things that really *are* in the world without us, are thoſe *motions* by which theſe ſeemings are cauſed. And this is the *great deception of ſenſe*, which alſo is to be by ſenſe *corrected*: for as ſenſ telleth me, when I ſee *directly*, that the colour ſeemeth to *be* in

in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by *reflection*, that Colour is in the Object.

CHAP. III.

1. *Imagination defined.*
2. *Sleep and Dreams defined.*
3. *Causes of Dreams.*
4. *Fiction defined.*
5. *Phantasms defined.*
6. *Remembrances defined.*
7. *Wherein Remembrance consisteth.*
8. *Why, in a Dream a man never thinks he Dreams.*
9. *Why few things seem strange in Dreams.*
10. *That a Dream may be taken for reality and Vision.*

AS standing water put into motion by the stroke of a *steon*, or blast of winde, doth

not

Cap. *not preſently* give over moving as ſoon as the winde ceaſeth, or the ſtone ſetleth: ſo *neither* doth the *effect* ceaſe which the *Object* hath wrought upon the *Brain*, ſo ſoon as ever, by turning aſide of the Organs the *Object ceaſeth* to work; that is to ſay, Though the *Senſe* be *paſt*, the *Image* or conception *remaineth*; but more *obſcure* while we are *awake*, becauſe ſome *Object* or other continually *plieth* and ſolliciteth our eyes and ears, *keeping* the Mind in a *ſtronger* motion, whereby the *weaker* doth *not* eaſily *appear*. And this obſcure conception is that we call *Phantaſie*, or *Imagination*: *Imagination* being (to define it) *conception remaining, and by little and little decaying from and after the act of Senſe.*

2. But when *preſent* Senſe is

not

not, as in *Sleep*, there the *Images* remaining after Senſe (when there be many) as in Dreams, are *not obſcure*, but *ſtrong* and *clear*, as in Senſe it ſelf. The reaſon is, That which obſcured and made the conceptions weak, namely Senſe, and preſent *operation* of the Object, is *removed*: for *Sleep* is the *privation of the act of Senſe*, (the power remaining) and *Dreams* are the *Imagination* of them that *ſleep*. 3.

3. The *cauſes* of Dreams (if they be natural) are the *actions* or violence of the *inward* parts of a man upon his *Brain*, by which the *paſſages* of Senſe by Sleep *benummed*, are *reſtored* to their motion. The ſignes by which this appeareth to be ſo, are the *differences* of Dreams (old men commonly dream oftner, and have their dreams more painfull then young) proceeding

Cap: ing from the *different* accidents of mans body; as Dreams of *Luſt*, as Dreams of *Anger*, according as the Heart, or other parts within, work more or leſs upon the Brain, by more or leſs *heat*; ſo alſo the deſcents of different *ſorts of Flegm* maketh us a dream of different taſts of meates and drinks; and I believe there is a *reciprocation* of motion from the Brain to the Vital parts, and back from the Vital parts to the Brain; whereby not onely *Imagination* begetteth *motion* in thoſe parts, but alſo motion in thoſe parts begetteth Imagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true, and that *ſad* imaginations nouriſh the *Spleen*, then we ſee alſo a cauſe, why a ſtrong *Spleen* reciprocally cauſeth *fearful dreams*, and why the effects of *Laſciviouſneſs* may in a dream

dream produce the image of 3.
ſome perſon that had *cauſed* them. Another ſigne that dreams are cauſed by the action of the inward parts, is the *diſorder* and caſual conſequence of one conception or image to another: for when we are *waking*, the *antecedent* thought or conception introduceth & is cauſe of the *conſequent*, (as the water followeth a mans finger upon a dry & level table) but in *Dreams* there is commonly *no coherence*, (and when there is, it is by chance) which muſt needs proceed from this, That the *brain* in dreams is *not reſtored* to its motion in every part alike; whereby it cometh to paſs, that our thoughts appear like the Stars between the flying Clouds, not in the order which a man would chuſe to obſerve them, but as the uncertain flight of broken Clouds permits.

4. As

Cap: 4. As when the *water*, or any liquid thing, moved at once by *divers* movents, receiveth *one* motion compounded of them all; so also the *Brain* or Spirit therein, having been stirred by *divers* Objects, composeth an Imagination of *divers* conceptions that appeared single to the Sense. As for Example, the Sense sheweth at one time the figure of a *mountain*, and at another time the colour of *gold*; but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a *golden mountain*. From the same cause it is, there appeareth unto us *castles* in the *air*, *Chimæra's*, and other monsters which are *not* in *Rerum Natura*, *but* have been conceived by the Sense in pieces at several times. And this composition is that which we commonly call *Fiction* of the Minde.

5. There

There is yet another kinde of Imagination, which for *clearneſs contendeth* with *Senſe*, as well as a *Dream*; and that is, when the *action* of Senſe hath been *long* or *vehement*: and the experience thereof is more frequent in the Senſe of Seeing, then the reſt. An Example whereof is, the *Image* remaining before the *eye* after looking upon the *Sun*. Alſo, thoſe little Images that appear before the eyes in the *dark*; whereof I think every man hath experience, (but they moſt of all, who are *timorous* or ſuperſtitious) are Examples of the ſame. And theſe, for diſtinction-ſake, may be called *Phantaſms*. 3.

6. By the *Senſes*, which are numbred according to the *Organs* to be *five*, we take notice (as hath been ſaid already) of the objects *without* us; and that

Cap. 2. *notice* is our *conception* thereof: but we take *notice* also some way or other *of our conceptions*: for when the conception of the same thing cometh *again*, we take notice that is *again*; that is to say, that we have had the same conception *before*; which is as much as to imagin a thing *past*; which is impossible to the *Sense*, which is onely of things *present*. This therefore may be accounted a *Sixth Sense*, but *internal*, (not *external*, as the rest) and is commonly called *Remembrance*.

7. For the *manner* by which we take notice of a conception *past*, we are to remember, that in the *definition* of *Imagination*, it is said to be a Conception by *little* and *little decaying*, or growing more *obscure*. An *obscure* conception is that which representeth the *whole object* together,

together, but *none* of the *ſmaller parts* by themſelves; and as *more* or *fewer* parts be repreſented, ſo is the conception or repreſentation ſaid to be *more* or *leſs clear*. Seeing then the *conception*, which when it was *firſt* produced by Senſe, was *clear*, and repreſented the *parts* of the object *diſtinctly*; and when it cometh *again* is *obſcure*, we find *miſſing* ſomewhat that we expected; by which we judge it *paſt* and *decayed*. For Example, a man that is preſent in a foraign *City*, ſeeth not onely *whole* ſtreets, but can alſo diſtinguiſh particular *houſes*, and *parts* of houſes, but departed thence, he cannot diſtinguiſh them ſo particularly in his minde as he did, ſome *houſe* or turning eſcaping him: yet is this to *remember*; when *afterwards* there eſcapeth him *more* parti- 3.

Cap. culars, this is alſo to *remember*, but *not* ſo well. In proceſs of time, the *Image* of the City *returneth* but as a *maſs* of building *onely*, which is *almoſt* to have *forgotten* it. Seeing then Remembrance is *more* or *leſs*, as we finde more or leſs *obſcurity*, Why may not we well think *Remembrance* to be nothing elſe but the *miſſing of parts*, which every man expecteth ſhould ſucceed after they have a conception of the whole? To ſee at a great diſtance of place, and to remember at great diſtance of time, is to have like conceptions of the thing: for there wanteth diſtinction of parts in both; the one conception being weak by operation at diſtance, the other by decay.

8. And from this that hath been ſaid, there followeth, That a man can *never know* he *dreameth*;

eth; he *may* dream he *doubteth* whether it be a dream or no: but the clearneſs of the Imagination repreſenteth every thing with as many parts as doth Senſe it ſelf, and conſequently, he can take notice of nothing but as preſent; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think thoſe his Conceptions, that is to ſay, obſcurer then they were in the Senſe: ſo that he muſt think them both as clear, and not as clear as Senſe; which is impoſſible. 3.

9. From the ſame ground it proceedeth, that men *wonder not* in their dreams at place and p rſons, as they would do waking: for waking, a man would think it ſtrange to be in a place where he never was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a dream, there cometh little of

that kinde into conſideration. The *clearneſs* of conception in a dream, taketh away *diſtruſt*, unleſs the *ſtrangeneſs* be *exceſſive*, as to think himſelf fallen from on high without hurt, and then moſtcommonly he *waketh*.

10. Nor is it *poſſible* for a man to be ſo far deceived, as when his dream is *paſt* to think it real: for if he dream of ſuch things as are ordinarily in his minde, and in ſuch order as he uſeth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to ſleep in the place where he findeth himſelf when he awaketh; all which may happen; I know no κριτήριον or mark by which he can diſcern whether it were a dream or not, and therefore do the leſs wonder to hear a man ſometimes to tell his dream for a truth, or to take it for a Viſion.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

1. *Diſcourſe.*
2. *The cauſe of coherence of Thoughts.*
3. *Ranging.*
4. *Sagacity.*
5. *Reminiſcence.*
6. *Experience.*
7. *Expectation.*
8. *Conjecture.*
9. *Signes.*
10. *Prudence.*
11. *Caveats of concluding from Experience.*

THe *ſucceſſion* of conceptions in the Minde, ſeries or conſequence of one after another, may be *caſual* and incoherent, as in dreams for the moſt part; and it may be *orderly*, as when the former thought in-

troduceth the later ; and this is *diſcourſe* of the Minde. But becauſe the word Diſcourſe is commonly taken for the *coherence* and conſequence of words, I will, to avoid equivocation, call it *diſcurſion*.

2. The *cauſe* of the *coherence* or conſequence of one conception to another, is their firſt *coherence* or conſequence at that *time* when they are produced by Senſe : As for Example, from S. *Andrew* the minde runneth to S. *Peter*, becauſe their names are read together ; from S. *Peter* to a *ſtone*, for the ſame cauſe ; from *ſtone* to *foundation*, becauſe we ſee them together ; and for the ſame cauſe, from Foundation to *Church*, and from Church to *People*, and from People to *Tumult* : and according to this example, the Minde may run almoſt from any thing

thing to any thing. But as in the *Senſe* the conception of Cauſe and Effect may ſucceed one another, ſo may they after Senſe in the *Imagination*: And for the moſt part they do ſo; the *cauſe* whereof is the *appetite* of them, who, having a conception of the *end*, have next unto it a conception of the next *means* to that end; As, when a man, from a thought of *Honour*, to which he hath an appetite, cometh to the thought of *wiſdom*, which is the next means thereunto; and from thence to the thought of *Studie*, which is the next means to wiſdom. 4.

3. To omit that kinde of Diſcurſion by which we proceed from any thing to any thing, there are of the *other* kinde *divers* ſorts: As firſt, in the *Senſes* there are certain coherences of conceptions which we may call

ranging: Examples whereof are; A man caſteth his *eye* upon the *ground*, to look about for ſome *ſmall* thing loſt; the *hounds* caſting about at a fault in hunting; and the *ranging* of Spaniels: and herein we take a beginning arbitrary.

4. Another ſort of Diſcurſion is, when the *appetite* giveth a man his beginning, as in the Example before, where Honour to which a man hath appetite, maketh him think upon the next means of attaining it, and that again of the next, *&c.* And this the Latines call *Sagacitas*, and We may call *Hunting* or *tracing*, as dogs trace beaſts by the ſmell, and men hunt them by their footſteps; or as men hunt after Riches, Place, or Knowledge.

5. There is yet another kinde of Diſcurſion beginning with the

the appetite to *recover* ſome- 4.
thing loſt, proceeding from the *preſent backward*, from thought of the place where we *miſs* at, to the thought of the place from whence we came *laſt*; and from the thought of that, to the thought of a place *before*, till we have in our minde ſome place wherein we had the thing we miſs: and this is called *Reminiſcence*.

6. The *remembrance* of ſucceſſion of one thing to another, that is, of what was *antecedent*, and what *conſequent*, and what *concomitant*, is called an *Experiment*, whether the ſame be made by us *voluntarily*, as when a man putteth any thing into the fire, to ſee what effect the fire will produce upon it; or *not* made by us, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have had many

experi-

experiments, is that we call *Experience*, which is nothing else but *remembrance* of what Antecedents have been followed by what Consequents.

7. No man can have in his minde a conception of the *future*; for the future is *not yet*: but of our conceptions of the *past*, we make a *future*; or rather, call *past*, *future* relatively. Thus after a man hath been accustomed to see like antecedents follow by like consequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any thing he had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that followed then: As for Example, because a man hath often seen offences followed by punishment, when he seeth an offence in present, he thinketh punishment to be consequent thereto; but consequent unto that which

is

is preſent, men call future: And thus we make *remembrance* to be the *previſion* of things to come, or *expectation* or preſumption of the future. 4.

8. In the ſame manner, if a man ſeeth in preſent that which he hath ſeen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he ſaw before, is alſo antecedent to that he preſently ſeeth: As for Example, he that hath ſeen the aſhes remain after the fire, and now again ſeeth aſhes, concludeth again there hath been fire: And this is called again *conjecture* of the paſt, or preſumption of the fact.

9. When a man hath *ſo often* obſerved like antecedents to be followed by like conſequents, that *whenſoever* he ſeeth the antecedent, he looketh again for the conſequent; or when he

ſeeth

ſeeth the conſequent, maketh account there hath been the like antecedent; then he calleth both the Antecedent and the Conſequent *Signes* one of another, as Clouds are ſignes of Rain to come, and Rain of Clouds paſt.

10. This taking of Signes by *experience*, is that wherein men do ordinarily think, the difference ſtands between man and man in *wiſdom*, by which they commonly underſtand a mans whole ability or *power cognitive*; but this is an *errour*: for the Signes are but *conjectural*; and according as they have often or ſeldom failed, ſo their *aſſurance* is more or leſs; but *never full* and *evident*, for though a man have always ſeen the day and night to follow one another hitherto, yet can he not thence conclude they ſhall do ſo, or that

that they have done ſo eternally: *Experience concludeth nothing univerſally.* If the Signes hit twenty times for one miſſing, a man may lay a Wager of Twenty to One of the event; but may not conclude it for a Truth. But by this it is plain, that they ſhall *conjecture beſt*, that have *moſt experience*, becauſe they have moſt Signes to conjecture by; which is the reaſon *old men* are *more prudent*, that is, conjecture better *cæteris paribus* then young: for, being old, they remember more; and Experience is but remembrance. And *men* of *quick* imagination *cæteris paribus* are more *prudent* then thoſe whoſe imaginations are ſlowe: for they obſerve *more* in *leſs* time. Prudence is nothing but Conjecture from Experience, or taking of Signes from Experience warily, that is, 4.

that

that the experiments from which he taketh such Signes be all remembred, for else the Cases are not alike that seem so.

11. As in Conjecture concerning things past and future, it is Prudence to conclude from Experience, what is like to come to pass, or to have passed already; so it is an errour to conclude from it, that *it is* so or so *called*; that is to say, We cannot from Experience conclude, that any thing is to be called *just* or *unjust*, *true* or *false*, or any Proposition *universal* whatsoever, except it be from Remembrance of the use of names imposed arbitrarily by men: For Example, to have heard a sentence given in the like case, the like sentence a thousand times is not enough to conclude that the Sentence is just; though

most

most men have no other means to conclude by: But it is *neceſſary*, for the drawing of ſuch concluſion, to *trace* and *finde out*, by many Experiences, what men do mean by calling things juſt and unjuſt, Further, there is another *Caveat* to be taken in concluding by Experience, from the Tenth Section of the ſecond Chapter; that is, that we conclude ſuch things to be without that are within us. 40.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

1. *Of Marks.*
2. *Names or appellations.*
3. *Names positive and privative.*
4. *Advantage of Names maketh us capable of Science.*
5. *Names universal and singular.*
6. *Universals not in* rerum natura.
7. *Equivocal names.*
8. *Understanding.*
9. *Affirmation, Negation, Proposition.*
10. *Truth, Falsity.*
11. *Ratiocination.*
12. *According to Reason, against Reason.*
13. *Names causes of Knowledge, so of Errour.*
14. *Transla-*

14. *Tranſlation of the Diſcourſe of the Minde into the diſcourſe of the Tongue, and of the errours thence proceeding.*

SEeing the *ſucceſſion* of Conceptions in the *Minde* are cauſed, as hath been ſaid before, by the ſucceſſion they *had* one to another when they were produced by the *Senſes*, & that there is no conception that hath not bin produced immediately before or after innumerable others, by the innnmerable acts of Senſe; it muſt needs follow, that one *Conception* followeth *not* another according to our *election*, and the need we have of them, *but* as it *chanceth* us to hear or ſee ſuch things as ſhall bring them to our minde. The experience we have hereof, is in ſuch brute beaſts, which, having the pro-

providence to hide the remains and ſuperfluity of their meat, do nevertheleſs want the remembrance of the place where they hide it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but Man, who in this point beginneth to rank himſelf ſomewhat above the nature of Beaſts, hath obſerved and remembred the cauſe of this defect, and to amend the ſame, hath imagined or deviſed to ſet up a viſible or other ſenſible mark, the which, when he ſeeth it again, may bring to his minde the thought he had when he ſet it up. A *mark* therefore is a *ſenſible object* which a man erecteth voluntarily to himſelf, to the end to *remember* thereby ſomewhat paſt, when the ſame is objected to his Senſe again: As men that have paſt by a Rock at Sea, ſet up ſome mark, thereby to remember

member their former danger, and avoid it. 5.

2. In the number of theſe *marks*, are thoſe *humane voices* which we call the *names* or appellations of things ſenſible by the ear, by which we recal into our minde ſome conceptions of the things to which we gave thoſe names or appellations; as the appellation *white* bringeth to remembrance the quality of ſuch objects as produce that colour or conception in us. A *name* or appellation therefore is the *voice* of a man *arbitrary*, impoſed for a *mark* to bring into his minde ſome conception concerning the thing on which it is impoſed.

3. Things named, are either the *objects* themſelves, as a man; or the *conception* it ſelf that we have of man: as ſhape and motion; or ſome privation, which

is when we conceive that there is ſomething which we conceive not, in him; as when we conceive he is not juſt, not finite, we give him the name of unjuſt, of infinite, which ſignifie privation or defect; and to the privations themſelves we give the names of injuſtice and infiniteneſs: ſo that here be *two ſorts* of names; one of *things*, in which we conceive ſomething; or of the conceptions themſelves, which are called *poſitive*; the other of things wherein we conceive *privation* or defect, and thoſe names are called *privative*.

4. By the advantage of *names* it is that we are capable of *Science*, which Beaſts, for want of them are not; nor Man, without the uſe of them: for as a Beaſt miſſeth not one or two out of many her young ones, for want of thoſe names of order,

der, One, Two, and Three, and which we call *number*; ſo neither would a Man, without repeating orally or mentally the words of number, know how many pieces of money or other things lie before him. 5.

5. Seeing there be *many* conceptions of *one* and the ſame thing, and for *every* conception we give it a *ſeveral* name; it followeth that for one and the ſame thing we have many names or attributes; as to the ſame man we give the appellations of *juſt*, *valiant*, &c. for divers *vertues*, of *ſtrong*, *comly*, &c. for divers *qualities* of the *body*. And again becauſe from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things muſt needs have the ſame appellation: as, to all things we *ſee*, we give the ſame name of *viſible*; and to all things we *ſee moveable*, we give

give the appellation of *moveable*: and those names we give to *many*, are called *universal* to them all; as the name of man to every particular of mankinde: such appellation as we give to *one* onely thing, we call *individual*, or singular; as *Socrates*, and other proper names; or, by circumlocution, he that writ the *Iliads* for *Homer*.

6. The universality of *one name* to many things, hath been the cause that men think the *things* are themselves universal; and so seriously contend, that besides *Peter*, and *John*, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call *Man*, viz. *man in general*; deceiving themselves, by taking the universal or general appellation, for the thing it signifieth: For if one should

should desire the Painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general, he meaneth no more, but that the Painter should chuse what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be; none of which are *universal*. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the King, or any particular person, he limiteth the Painter to that one person he chuseth. It is plain therefore, that there is *nothing universal* bt *Names*; which are therefore called *indefinite*; because we limit them not our selves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth; as when we say This man, pointing to him, or giving him his 5.

proper name, or by ſome ſuch other way.

7. The appellations that be *univerſal*, and common to many things, are *not* always given to all the *particulars*, (as they ought to be) for, like conceptions, and like conſiderations in them all; which is the cauſe that many of them are *not* of *conſtant* ſignification, but bring into our minde other thoughts then theſe for which they were ordained, and thoſe are called *equivocal*. As for Example, the word Faith ſignifieth the ſame with Belief; ſometimes it ſignifieth particularly that Belief which maketh a Chriſtian, and ſometime it ſignifieth the keeping of a promiſe. Alſo all *metaphors* are by profeſſion *equivocal*: and there is ſcarce any word that is not made *equivocal* by divers contextures of ſpeech,

ſpeech, or by diverſity of pro- 5.
nunciation and geſture.

8. This *equivocation* of names maketh it *difficult* to recover thoſe conceptions for which the name was ordained; and that not onely in the language of other men, wherein we are to conſider the *drift*, and *occaſion*, and *contexture* of the ſpeech, as well as the *words* themſelves; but alſo in our diſcourſe, which being derived from the cuſtom and common uſe of ſpeech, repreſenteth unto us not our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumſtances of Language, to deliver himſelf from *Equivocation*, and to finde out the true meaning of what is ſaid: And this is it we call *Underſtanding*.

9. Of *two appellations*, by the help of this little Verbe *is*, or

ſomething equivalent, we make an *affirmation* or *negation*, either of which in the Schools we call alſo a *Propoſition*, and conſiſteth of two appellations joyned together by the ſaid Verb *is*. As for Example, Man is a living creature; or thus, Man is not righteous: whereof the former is called an *affirmation*, becauſe the appellation Living creature is *poſitive*; the latter a *negative*, becauſe not righteous is *privative*.

10. In *every Propoſition*, be it affirmative or negative, the later appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this Propoſition, Charity is a vertue, the name of Vertue comprehendeth the name of Charity, and many other vertues beſide; and then is the Propoſition ſaid to be *true*, or *truth*: For, *truth*, and a *true propoſition*, is all one.

Or

Or *elſe* the *later* appellation comprehendeth *not* the former: as in this Propoſition, every man is juſt, the name of Juſt comprehendeth not every man; for Unjuſt is the name of the far greater part of men: And the Propoſition is ſaid to be *falſe*, or falſity; *Falſity* and a *falſe Propoſition* being alſo the ſame thing. 5.

11. In what manner of two Propoſitions, whether *both* affirmative, or *one* affirmative, the *other* negative, is made a *Syllogiſm*, I forbear to write. All this that hath been ſaid of names or Propoſitions, though *neceſſary*, is but *dry* diſcourſe: and this place is not for the whole Art of Logick, which if I enter further into, I ought to purſue: Beſides, it is not needfull; for there be few men which have not ſo much natural Logick, as thereby

to diſcern well enough whether any Concluſion I ſhall make in this Diſcourſe hereafter, be well or ill collected: Onely thus much I ſay in this place, that *making of Syllogiſms* is that we call *Ratiocination* or *Reaſoning*.

12. Now when a man *reaſoneth* from *principles* that are *found* indubitable by experience, all deceptions of Senſe and equivocation of words avoided, the Concluſion he maketh is ſaid to be *according to Right Reaſon*: But when from his Concluſion a man may, by good Ratiocination, derive that which is *contradictory* to any evident truth whatſoever, then he is ſaid to have concluded *againſt Reaſon*: And ſuch a Concluſion is called *abſurdity*.

13. As the *invention of names* hath been *neceſſary* for the drawing

drawing men *out of* Ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the neceſſary *coherence* of one conception to another; ſo alſo hath it on the other ſide precipitated men into *Errour*: Inſomuch, that whereas by the benefit of *words* and Ratiocination they exceed *Brute beaſts* in Knowledge, and the commodities that accompany the ſame; ſo they exceed them alſo in *Errour*: for, *true* and *falſe* are things not incident to beaſts, becauſe they adhere not to propoſitions and Language; nor have they Ratiocination, whereby to multiply one untruth by another, as men have.

14. It is the *nature* almoſt of every *Corporal* thing, being *often moved* in one and the ſame manner, to receive continually a *greater* and *greater eaſineſs* and aptitude to the *ſame* motion, in-

ſomuch as in time the ſame becometh ſo *habitual*, that, to *beget* it, there needs no more then to *begin* it. The *Paſſions* of man, as they are the beginning of *voluntary* motions; ſo are they the beginning of *Speech*, which is the motion of the tongue. And men deſiring to ſhew others the Knowledge, opinions, conceptions and paſſions which are in themſelves, and to that end having invented *Language*, have by that means transferred all that *diſcurſion* of their *minde* mentioned in the former Chapter, by the *motion* of their *tongues*, into *diſcourſe* of *words*: And *Ratio* now is but *Oratio*, for the moſt part, wherein Cuſtom hath ſo great a power, that the Minde ſuggeſteth onely the firſt word; the reſt follow *habitually*, and are not followed by the Minde; as it

is

is with Beggers, when they ſay their *Pater noſter*, putting together ſuch words, and in ſuch manner, as in their education they have learned from their Nurſes, from their Companies, or from their Teachers, having *no Images* or *Conceptions* in their Minde anſwering to the words they ſpeak: and as they have learned themſelves, ſo they teach poſterity. Now if we conſider the power of thoſe *deceptions* of the Senſe mentioned Chap. 2. Sect. 10. and alſo how *unconſtantly* names have been ſetled, and how ſubject they are to *Equivocation*, and how *diverſified* by *paſſion*, (ſcarce two men agreeing what is to be called Good, and what Evil; what Liberallity, what Prodigallity; what Valour, what Temerity) and how ſubject men are to Paralogiſm or fallacie in reaſoning, 5.

I may in a manner conclude, that it is impossible to *rectyfie* so many Errours of any one man, as must needs proceed from those causes, without begining *anew* from the very first grounds of all our Knowledge & Sense; and instead of Books, reading over orderly ones own Conceptions: In which meaning, I take *Nosce Teipsum* for a precept worthy the reputation it hath gotten.

CHAP. VI.

1. *Of the two kindes of Knowledge.*
2. *Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge.*
3. *Evidence defined.*
4. *Science defined.*
5. *Supposition defined.*
6. *Opinion defined.*

7. *Belief defined.*
8. *Conſcience defined.*
9. *Belief, in ſome caſes, no leſs from Doubt then Knowledg.*

1. THere is a Story ſomewhere, of one that pretends to have been miraculouſly cured of Blindneſs (wherewith he was born) by S. *Albane* or other Saints, at the Town of S. *Albans*; and that the Duke of *Glouceſter* being there, to be ſatisfied of the truth of the Miracle, asked the man What Colour is this? who, by anſwering, It was Green, diſcovered himſelf, and was puniſhed for a Counterfeit: for though by his ſight newly received he might diſtinguiſh between Green, and Red, and all other Colours, as well as any that ſhould interrogate him, yet he could not poſſibly know

as

at first sight which of them was called Green, or Red, or by any other name. By this we may understand, there be *two kindes* of Knowledge, whereof the *one* is nothing else but *Sense*, or Knowledge *original*, as I have said in the beginning of the Second Chapter, and *remembrance* of the same; the *other* is called *Science*, or knowledge of the *truth of Propositions*, and how things are called; and is derived from *Understanding*. Both of these sorts are but *Experience*; the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us from *without*, and the later experience men have from the proper use of *names* in Language: and all Experience being, as I have said, but Remembrance, all Knowledge is Remembrance: and of the *former*, the Register we keep in Books,

Books, is called *Hiſtory*; but the Regiſters of the *later* are called the *Sciences*. 6.

2. There are *two thinge* neceſſarily implied in this word *Knowledge*; the one is *Truth*, the other *Evidence*: for what is not Truth, can never be known: for, let a man ſay he knoweth a thing never ſo well, if the ſame ſhall afterwards appear falſe, he is driven to confeſſion, that it was not Knowledge, but Opinion. Likewiſe, if the truth be not evident, though a man holdeth it, yet is his knowledge thereof no more then theirs who hold the contrary: for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge, all Truth were known; which is not ſo.

3. What *Truth* is, hath been defined in the *precedent* Chapter; what *Evidence* is, I *now* ſet down: and it is the concomitance

of

of a mans *conception* with the *words* that signifie such conception in the act of Ratiocination: for when a man reasoneth with his lips onely, to which the Minde suggesteth onely the beginning, and followeth not the words of his mouth with the conceptions of his minde, out of custom of so speaking; though he begin his Ratiocination with true Propositions, and proceed with certain Syllogisms, and thereby make always true Conclusions; yet are not his Conclusions *evident* to him, for want of the *concomitance* of *conception* with his words: for if the words alone were sufficient, a *parrat* might be taught as well to know Truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to Truth, as the Sap to the Tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with body and branches, keepeth them

them alive; where it forſaketh them, they die: for this evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the life of Truth. 6.

4. Knowledge therefore which we call *Science*, I define to be *evidence of Truth*, from ſome beginning or principle of *Senſe*: for the truth or a Propoſition is never evident, until we conceive the meaning of the words or terms whereof it conſiſteth, which are always conceptions of the Minde: Nor can we remember thoſe Conceptions, without the thing that produced the ſame by our Senſes. The *firſt* principle of knowledge is, that we have ſuch and ſuch *Conceptions*; the *ſecond*, that we have thus and thus *named* the things whereof they are conceptions; the *third* is, that we have *joyned* thoſe *names* in ſuch manner as to make true Propoſitions;

ſitions; the *fourth* and laſt is, that we have *joyned* thoſe *Propoſitions* in ſuch manner as they be concluding, and the truth of the concluſion ſaid to be known. And of theſe two kindes of Knowledge, whereof the former is *experience of fact*, and the latter of *evidence of truth*; as the *former*, if it be great, is called *Prudence*; ſo the *later*, if it be much, hath uſually bin called, both by ancient and modern Writers, *Sapience* or Wiſdom: and of this *later*, *man* onely is capable; of the *former*, *brute beaſts* alſo participate.

5. A Propoſition is ſaid to be *ſuppoſed*, when, being *not evident*, it is nevertheleſs *admitted for a time*, to the end, that, joyning to it other Propoſitions, we may *conclude* ſomething; and to *proceed* from concluſion to Concluſion, for a *trial* whether the ſame

ſame wil lead us into any *abſurd* or impoſſible Concluſion; which if it *do*, then we know ſuch ſuppoſition to have been falſe. 6.

6. But if, running thorow *many* Concluſions, we come to *none* that are *abſurd*, then we think the Propoſition *probable*: likewiſe we think probable whatſoever Propoſition we *admit* for truth by errour of reaſoning, or from truſting to other men: And all ſuch Propoſitions as are admitted by *truſt* or errour, we are not ſaid to *know*, but *think* them to be true; and the admittance of them is called *Opinion*.

7. And particularly, when the Opinion is admitted out of *truſt* to *other* men, they are ſaid to *believe* it; and their admittance of it is called *Belief*, and ſometimes *Faith*.

8. It is eitheir *Science* or *Opinion*

nion which we commonly mean by the word *Conſcience* : for men ſay that ſuch and ſuch a thing is true in or upon their Conſcience ; which they *never* do, when they think it *doubtful*; and therefore they *know* or *think* they know it to be true. But men, when they ſay things upon their Conſcience, are not therefore preſumed certainly to know the truth of what they ſay : It remaineth then, that that word is uſed by them that have an *opinion*, *not* onely of the *truth* of the thing, *but* alſo of their *knowledg* of it, to which the truth of the Propoſition is conſequent. *Conſcience* I therefore define to be *opinion of evidence*.

9. *Belief*, which is the admitting of Propoſitions upon *truſt*, in many caſes is no leſs free from *Doubt* then perfect and

and manifeſt *Knowledge* : for as there is nothing whereof there is not ſome Cauſe ; ſo, when there is doubt, there muſt be ſome Cauſe thereof conceived. Now there be many things which we receive from *report of others*, of which it is impoſſible to imagine any cauſe of *doubt* : for, what can be oppoſed againſt the conſent of all men, in things they can know, and have no cauſe to report otherwiſe then they are, (ſuch as is great part of our *Hiſtories*) unleſs a man would ſay that all the world had *conſpired* to deceive him. And thus much of *Senſe*, *Imagination*, *Diſcurſion*, *Ratiocination*, and *Knowledge*, which are the acts of our *power cognitive*, or *conceptive*. That power of the *Minde* which we call *motive*, differeth from the power *motive* of the *bodie* : for the

6.

the power *motive* of the body is that by which it *moveth other bodies*, and we call *ſtrength*; but the power motive of the *Minde*, is that by which the Minde giveth *animal motion* to that *body* wherein it exiſteth; the acts hereof are our *Affections* and *Paſſions*, of which I am to ſpeak in general.

CHAP. VII.

Of Delight, Pain, Love, Hatred.
Appetite, Averſion, Fear.
Good, Evil, Pulcritude, Turpitude.
End, Fruition.
Profitable, Uſe, Vain.
Felicity.
Good and Evil mixt.

Senſual

Senſual Delight, and Pain; Joy and Grief.

IN the Eight Section of the Second Chapter is ſhewed, that *conceptions* and *apparitions* are nothing *really*, but *motion* in ſome internal ſubſtance of the *head*; which motion *not ſtopping* there, but proceeding to the *heart*, of neceſſity muſt there either *help* or *hinder* the motion which is called *Vital*: when it *helpeth*, it is called *Delight*, *Contentment*, or *Pleaſure*, which is nothing really but motion about the heart, as Conception is nothing but motion in the head; and the *Objects* that cauſe it are called *pleaſant* or *delightful*, or by ſome name equivalent. The *Latines* have *Jucundum*, *à juvando*, from helping; and the ſame delight, with reference to the object, is called *Love*: but when

when such motion *weakneth* or hindereth the vital motion, then it is called *Pain*; and in relation to that which causeth it, Hatred, which the *Latines* express sometimes by *Odium*, and sometimes by *Tædium*.

2. This motion in which consisteth *Pleasure* or *Pain*, is also a *sollicitation* or provocation either to draw *neer* to the thing that pleaseth, or to *retire* from the thing that displeaseth; and this sollicitation is the *endeavour* or internal beginning of *animal* motion, which when the object *delighteth*, is called *appetite*; when it *displeaseth*, it is called *aversion*, in respect of the displeasure *present*; but in respect of the displeasure *expected*, *fear*. So that *pleasure*, *love*, and *appetite*, which is also called Desire, are *divers names*, for divers considerations of the *same thing*.

3. Every

3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which *pleaſeth*, and is delightfull to himſelf, *Good*; and that *Evil* which *diſpleaſeth* him: inſomuch that while every man *differeth* from other in *conſtitution*, they differ alſo from one another concerning the common diſtinction of Good and Evil. Nor is there any ſuch thing as Abſolute Goodneſs, conſidered without relation: for even the goodneſs which we apprehend in God Almighty, is *his goodneſs to us*. And as we call *good* and *evil* the *things* that pleaſe and diſpleaſe; ſo call we *goodneſs* and *badneſs* the *qualities* or powers whereby they do it: And the ſignes of that goodneſs are called by the *Latines* in one word *Pulchritudo*, and the ſignes of evil *Turpitudo*; to which we have no words preciſely anſwerable. 7.

4. A

4. As all Conceptions we have immediately by the *Senſe*, are, *delight*, or *pain*, or *appetite*, or *fear*; ſo are all the *Imaginations* after Senſe. But as they are weaker Imaginations, ſo are they alſo weaker pleaſures, or weaker pain.

5. As *appetite* is the beginning of *animal* motions towards ſomething that pleaſeth us; ſo is the *attaining* thereof the *end* of that motion, which wee alſo call the *ſcope*, and aim, and final cauſe of the ſame: and when we attain that end, the delight wè have thereby is called the *fruition*: So that *bonum* and *finis* are different names, but for different conſiderations of the ſame thing.

6. And of *ends*, ſome of them are called *propinque*, that is, neer at hand; others *remoti*, far off: but when the ends that be

be neerer attaining, be compared with those that be further off, they are called not ends, but *means*, and the *way* to those. But for an *utmost* end, in which the ancient *Philosophers* have placed *felicity*, and disputed much concerning the way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, more then to *Utopia*: for while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further end. Those things which please us, as the way or *means* to a further end, we call *profitable*; and the *fruition* of them, *use*; and those things that profit not, *vain*. 7

7. Seeing all *delight* is *Appetite*; and presupposeth a *further* end, there can be *no contentment* but in *proceeding*; and therefore we are not to marvel, when we see, that as men attain to more Riches, Honour, or other

Power, ſo their appetite continually groweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmoſt degree of ſome kinde of Power, they purſue ſome other, as long as in any kinde they think themſelves behinde any other: Of thoſe therefore that have attained to the higheſt degree of Honour and Riches, ſome have affected Maſtery in ſome Art; as *Nero* in Muſick and Poetry, *Commodus* in the Art of a Gladiator; and ſuch as affect not ſome ſuch thing, muſt finde diverſion and recreation of their thoughts in the contention either of play or buſineſs: and men juſtly complain of a great grief, that they know not what to do. *Felicity* therefore, by which we mean continual delight, conſiſteth *not* in *having* proſpered, but in *proſpering*.

8. There

8. There are few things in this world, but *either* have *mixture* of good and evil, *or* there is a chain of them ſo neceſſarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other: As for Example, the pleaſures of ſin, and the bitterneſs of puniſhment, are inſeparable; as is alſo labour and honour, for the moſt part. Now when in the *whole chain* the *greater part* is good, the *whole* is called *Good*; and when the *Evil* over-weigheth, the whole is called *Evil.* 7.

9. There are two ſorts of Pleaſure, whereof the *one* ſeemeth to affect the *corporeal* organ of the Senſe, and that I call *ſenſual*; the *greateſt* part whereof, is that by which we are invited to give continuance to our *ſpecies*; and the *next*, by which a man is invited to meat, for the

preſervation of his *individual* perſon : The *other ſort* of Delight is not particular to any part of the body, and is called The delight of the *Minde*, and is that which we call *Joy*. Likewiſe of *Pains*, ſome affect the *Body*, and are therefore called the *pains* of the body ; and ſome *not*, and thoſe are called *Grief*.

CHAP. VIII.

1, 2. *Where in conſiſt the pleaſures of Senſe.*
3, 4. *Of the Imagination, or conception of power in man.*
5. *Honour, honourable, Worth.*
6. *Signes of honour.*
7. *Reverence.*

1. HAving in the firſt Section of the precedent Chapter preſuppoſed, that motion

motion and *agitation of the brain* which we call conception, to be continued *to the heart*, and there to be called *Paſſion*; I have therefore obliged my ſelf, as far forth as I am able, to ſearch out and declare *from what* Conception *proceedeth* every one of thoſe *Paſſions* which we commonly take notice of: for, ſeeing the things that pleaſe and diſpleaſe are innumerable, and work innumerable ways, men have not taken notice but of a very few, which alſo are many of them without name.

2. And firſt, we are to conſider, that of Conceptions there are *three ſorts*, whereof one is of that which is *preſent*, which is *Senſe*; another, of that which is *paſt*, which is *Remembrance*; and the third, of that which is *future*, which we call *Expectation*: all which have been mani-

festly declared in the second and third Chapters; and every of these Conceptions *is Pleasur* or *Pain present.* And first for the pleasures of the *body* which affect the Sense of *touch* and *taste*, as far forth as they be *Organical*, their conceptions are *Sense*: so also is the pleasure of all *exonerations* of Nature: All which Passions I have before named *Sensual pleasures*, and their contrary *Sensual pains*: to which also may be added the pleasures and displeasures of *Odours*, if any of them shall be found Organical, which for the most part they are not, as appeareth by this experience which every man hath, that the same Smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from our selves; but when we think they proceed from our selves, they dis-

displeaſe not, though they come from others: the diſpleaſure of this is a Conception of hurt thereby from thoſe Odours, as being unwholeſom, and is therefore a conception of evil to come, and not preſent. Concerning the delight of *hearing*, it is divers, and the Organ it ſelf not affected thereby: *Simple ſounds* pleaſe by *equality*, as the ſound of a Bell or Lute; inſomuch as it ſeems an equality continued by the percuſſion of the object upon the ear, is pleaſure; the contrary is called *harſhneſs*, ſuch as is grating and ſome other ſounds, which do not always affect the body, but onely ſome time, and that with a kinde of horrour beginning at the teeth. *Harmony*, or many ſounds together agreeing, pleaſe by the ſame reaſon as the *Uniſon*, which is the ſound of equal 8.

ſtrings equally ſtretched. Sounds that differ in any *height*, pleaſe by *inequality and equality alternate*, that is to ſay, the higher note ſtriketh twice for one ſtroke of the other, whereby they ſtrike together every ſecond time; as is well proved by *Galileo*, in the firſt Dialogue concerning local motion; where he alſo ſheweth, that two ſounds differing a *fifth*, delight the ear by an *equality* of ſtriking *after two inequalities*, for the higher note ſtriketh the ear thrice, while the other ſtrikes but twice. In like manner he ſheweth wherein conſiſteth the pleaſure of Concord, and the diſpleaſure of Diſcord, in other difference of notes. There is yet *another* pleaſure and diſpleaſure of Sounds, which conſiſteth in *conſequence of one note after another*, *diverſified* both by *accent*

cent and *measure*; whereof that which pleaseth is called *air*; but for what reason succession in tone and measure is more air then another, I confess I know not; but I conjecture the reason to be so: that some of them imitate and revive some passion which otherwise we take no notice of, and the other not; for *no air pleaseth but for a time*, no more doth Imitation. Also the pleasures of the *eye* consist in a certain *equality* of *Colour*: for *Light*, the most glorious of all Colours, is made by *equal* operation of the object; whereas *Colour* is *perturbed*, that is to say, unequal light, as hath been said, *Chap.* 2. *Sect.* 8. And therefore Colours, the more equality is in them, the more resplendent they are: and as *Harmony* is pleasure to the ear, which consisteth of *divers* 8.

ſounds; ſo perhaps may ſome mixture of *divers Colours* be *harmony* to the *eye*, more then another mixture. There is yet another delight by the *ear*, which happeneth onely to men of skill in Muſick, which is of another uature, (and not as theſe) conception of the preſent, but rejoycing of their own skill; of which nature are the Paſſions of which I am to ſpeak next.

3. Conception of the *future*, is but a *ſuppoſition* of the *ſame*, proceeding from *Remembrance* of what is paſt; and we ſo far *conceive* that any thing *will be hereafter*, as we *know* there is *ſomething at the preſent* that hath power to produce it: and that any thing hath power now to produce another thing hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore.

Where fore

Wherefore all conception of future, is conception of power able to produce ſomething: Whoſoever therefore expecteth pleaſure to come, muſt conceive withal ſome power in himſelf by which the ſame may be attained. And becauſe the paſſions whereof I am to ſpeak next conſiſt in conception of the future, that is to ſay; in conception of power paſt, & the act to come; before I go any further, I muſt in the next place ſpeak ſomewhat concerning this power. 8.

4. By this power I mean the ſame with the faculties of the *Body*, *Nutritive*, *Generative*, *Motive*, and of the *Minde*, *Knowledge*; and beſides theſe, ſuch *further* power as by them is acquired, *viz. Riches*, *Place* of authority, *Friendſhip* or *Favour*, and *Good Fortune*; *which* laſt is really nothing elſe but the favour

favour of God Almighty. The *contraries* of these are *impotencies*, *infirmities*, or *defects* of the said powers respectively. And because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another, *power* simply is no more, but the *excess* of the power of one above that of another: for equal powers opposed, destroy one another; and such their opposition is called Contention.

5. The *signes* by which we know our own *power*, are those *actions* which proceed from the same; and the signes by which *other men* know it, are such *actions*, *gesture*, *countenance* and *speech* as usually such powers produce: and the *acknowledgement* of power is called Honour; and to honour a man inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that that man hath the oddes or excess

exceſs of that power above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himſelf. And honourable are thoſe ſignes for which one man acknowledgeth power or exceſs above his concurrent in another: As for Example, *Beauty* of perſon, conſiſting in a lively aſpect of the countenance, & other *ſignes* of *natural heat*, are honorable, being ſignes precedent of power *generative*, and much iſſue; as alſo, general reputation among thoſe of the other ſex, becauſe ſignes conſequent of the ſame. And actions proceeding from *ſtrength of body*, and open force, are honourable, as ſignes conſequent of power *motive*, ſuch as are victory in Battel or Duel; *A d'avoir tuè ſon homme*. Alſo to adventure upon great exploits and danger, as being a ſigne conſequent of opinion of our own ſtrength, 8.

ſtrength, and that opinion a ſigne of the ſtrength it ſelf. And to teach or perſwade are honorable, becauſe they be ſignes of *Knowledge*. And Riches are honourable, as ſignes of the power that acquired them: And gifts, coſt, and magnificence of houſes, apparel, and the like, are honourable, as ſignes of Riches. And *Nobility* is honourable by reflection, as a ſigne of power in the Anceſtors: And *Authority*, becauſe a ſigne of the ſtrength, wiſdom, favour or riches by which it is attained. And *Good fortune* or caſual proſperity is honourable, becauſe a ſigne of the favour of God, to whom is to be aſcribed all that cometh to us by fortune, no leſs then that we attain unto by induſtry. And the contraries and defects of theſe ſignes are diſhonourable; and according

to

to the ſignes of honour and diſ- 8
honour, ſo we eſtimate and make the value or worth of a man: for ſo much worth is every thing, as a man will give for the uſe of all it can do.

6. The *ſignes* of *Honour* are thoſe by which we perceive that one man acknowledgeth the power and worth of another, ſuch as theſe, to *praiſe*, to *magnifie*, to *bleſs*, to call happie, to pray or ſupplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or preſent, to obey, to hearken unto with attention, to ſpeak to with conſideration, to approach unto in decent manner, to keep diſtance from, to give way to, and the like, which are the honour the inferiour giveth to the ſuperiour.

But the *ſignes* of *Honour* from the Superiour to the Inferiour, are ſuch as theſe; to *praiſe* or prefer him before his concurrent,

rent, to hear more willingly, to ſpeak to him more familiarly, to admit him neerer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his opinions, and to give him *any gifts rather then money*; or if money, ſo much as may *not* imply his *need* of a *little*: for need of a little is greater poverty then need of much. And this is enough for Examples of the ſignes of Honour and Power.

7. *Reverence* is the conception we have concerning another, that he hath the *power* to do unto us both *good* and *hurt*, but *not* the *will* to do us *hurt*.

8. In the pleaſure men have, or diſpleaſure from the ſignes of honour or diſhonour done unto them, conſiſteth the nature of the Paſſions whereof we are to ſpeak in the next Chapter.

CHAP.

CAAP. IX.

1 *Glory aſpiring, falſe glory, vain glory.*
2 *Humility and Dejection.*
3 *Shame.*
4 *Courage.*
5 *Anger.*
6 *Revengefulneſs.*
7 *Hope, Deſpair, Diffidence.*
8 *Truſt.*
9 *Pity and hardneſs of heart.*
10 *Indignation.*
11 *Emulation and Envie.*
12 *Laughter.*
13 *Weeping.*
14 *Luſt.*
15 *Love,*
16 *Charity.*
17 *Admiration and Curioſity.*
18 *Of the Paſſion of them that flock to ſee danger.*

19 *Of*

19 *Of Magnanimity and Pusillanimity.*

20 *A view of the Passions represented in a Race.*

GLory, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is the Passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our *own power* above the power of him that contendeth with us; the *signes* whereof, besides those in the countenance, and other gestures of the body which cannot be described, are, *ostentation* in words, and *insolency* in actions: and this Passion, of them whom it displeaseth, is called *Pride*; by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a *just valuation* of himself. This imagination of our power or worth, may be from an assured and certain *experience* of our own actions; and then

then is that glory *juſt*, and well grounded, and begetteth an opinion of *increaſing* the fame by other actions to follow; in which conſiſteth the appetite which we call *aſpiring*, or proceeding from one degree of power to another. The ſame Paſſion may proceed *not* from any *conſcience* of our own actions, but from fame and truſt of *others*, whereby one may think well of himſelf, and yet be deceived; and this is *falſe glory*, and the aſpiring conſequent thereto procureth ill ſucceſs. Further, the *fiction* (which is alſo imagination) of actions done by our ſelves, which never were done, is *glorying*; but becauſe it begetteth no appetite nor endeavour to any further attempt, it is meerly *vain* and unprofitable; as when a man imagineth himſelf to do the 9.

actions

actions whereof he readeth in ſome *Romance*, or to be like unto ſome other man whoſe acts he admireth: And this is called *Vain glory*; and is exemplified in the Fable, by the Fly ſitting on the Axle-tree, and ſaying to himſelfe, What a duſt do I make riſe! The expreſſion of *Vain glory* is that wiſh, which ſome of the School miſtaking for ſome appetite diſtinct from all the reſt, have called *Velleity*, making a new word, as they made a new paſſion which was not before. *Signes* of *Vaine glory* in the *geſture*; are, *imitation* of others, counterfeiting and uſurping the ſignes of vertue they have not; affectation of faſhions, captation of honour from their dreames, and other little ſtories of themſelves, from their Country, from their Names, and from the like.

2. The

2. The Paſſion *contrary to glory*, proceeding from apprehenſion of our own Infirmity, is called *Humility* by thoſe by whom it is approved; by the reſt, *Dejection* and poorneſs: which conception may be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth fear to attempt any thing raſhly; if ill, it utterly Cows a man, that he neither dares ſpeak publikely, nor expect good ſucceſs in any action. 9.

3. It happeneth ſometimes, that he that hath a *good* opinion of himſelf, and upon good ground, may nevertheleſs, by reaſon of the *frowardneſs* which that Paſſion begetteth, diſcover in himſelf ſome *defect* or infirmity, the remembrance whereof dejecteth him; and this Paſſion is called *Shame*; by which being cooled and checked in his forwardneſs, he is more wary for the

actions whereof he readeth in ſome *Romance*, or to be like unto ſome other man whoſe acts he admireth: And this is called *Vain glory*; and is exemplified in the Fable, by the Fly ſitting on the Axle-tree, and ſaying to himſelfe, What a duſt do I make riſe! The expreſſion of *Vain glory* is that wiſh, which ſome of the School miſtaking for ſome appetite diſtinct from all the reſt, have called *Velleity*, making a new word, as they made a new paſſion which was not before. *Signes* of *Vaine glory* in the *geſture*; are, *imitation* of others, counterfeiting and uſurping the ſignes of vertue they have not; affectation of faſhions, captation of honour from their dreames, and other little ſtories of themſelves, from their Country, from their Names, and from the like.

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the time to come. This Paſſion, as it is a ſigne of *infirmity*, which is *diſhonour*; ſo alſo it is a ſigne of *knowledge*, which is *honour*. The ſigne of it is *bluſhing*, which appeareth leſs in men conſcious of their own defect, becauſe they leſs betray their infirmities they acknowledge.

4. *Courage*, in a *large* ſignification, is the *abſence* of *Fear* in the preſence of any evil whatſoever: but in a *ſtrict* and more common meaning, it is *contempt* of *wounds* and *death*, when they oppoſe a man in the way to his end.

5. *Anger* or ſudden Courage is nothing but the *appetite* or deſire of *overcoming preſent* oppoſition. It hath been defined commonly to be grief proceeding from an opinion of Contempt; which is confuted by the often experience which we have

have of being moved to anger by things inanimate, and without ſenſe, and conſequently incapable of contemning us. 9.

6. *Revengefulneſs* is that Paſſion which ariſeth from an expectation or *imagination* of *making* him that hath *hurt* us, *finde* his *own actions hurtful* to himſelf, and to *acknowledge* the ſame; and this is the height of Revenge: for though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make ones adverſary diſpleaſed with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the ſame, is ſo difficult, that many a man had rather die then do it. Revenge aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity or ſubjection of an enemy; which was well expreſſed in the exclamation of *Tiberius Cæſar*, concerning one, that, to fruſtrate his revenge, had killed himſelf in priſon;

priſon; *Hath he eſcaped me?* To *kill*, is the aim of them that *hate*, to *rid* themſelves out of fear: *Revenge* aimeth at *Triumph*, which over the dead is not.

7. *Repentance* is the Paſſion which proceedeth from *opinion* or knowledge that the *action* they have done is *out of the way* to the *end* they would attain: the effect whereof is, to purſue that way no longer, but, by the conſideration of the end, to direct themſelves into a better. The firſt motion therefore in this Paſſion is *Grief*; but the expectation or conception of returning again in to the way, is *Joy*; and conſequently, the paſſion of *Repentance* is compounded and allayed of both: but the *predominant* is *Joy*; elſe were the whole Grief, which cannot be, foraſmuch as he that proceedeth towards the end, he con-

conceiveth good proceedeth with appetite ; and appetite is Joy, as hath been ſaid, Chap. 7. Sect. 2. 9.

8. *Hope* is *expectation* of *good* to come, as Fear is the expectation of evil : But when there be cauſes, ſome that make us expect good, and ſome that make us expect evil, alternately working in our minde ; if the cauſes that make us expect good, be greater then thoſe that make us expect evil, the whole Paſſion is Hope ; if contrarily the whole is Fear. Abſolute *privation* of Hope is *Deſpair*, a degree whereof is *Diffidence*.

9. *Truſt* is a Paſſion proceeding from the *belief of him* from whom we *expect* or *hope* for good, ſo *free* from *doubt* that upon the ſame we purſue no other way to attain the ſame good : as *Diſtruſt* or diffidence

is *Doubt*, that maketh him endeavour to provide himſelf by other means. And that this is the meaning of the words Truſt and Diſtruſt, is manifeſt from this, that a man never provideth himſelf by a ſecond way, but when he miſtruſteth that the firſt will not hold.

10. *Pity* is *imagination* or *fiction* of *future* Calamity to our *ſelves*, proceeding from the ſenſe of *another* mans Calamity. But when it lighteth on ſuch as we think have not deſerved the ſame, the compaſſion is greater, becauſe then there appeareth more probability that the ſame may happen to us: for, the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we ſee a man ſuffer for great crimes, which we cannot eaſily think will fall upon our ſelves, the pity

is

is the leſs. And therefore men are apt to pity thoſe whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not worthy of Calamity. Thence it is alſo, that men pity the Vices of ſome perſons at the firſt ſight onely, out of love to their aſpect. The contrary of Pity is *hardneſs of heart*, proceeding either from *ſlowneſs* of imagination, or ſome extreme great *opinion* of their own *exemption* from the like Calamity, or from hatred of all or moſt men. 9.

11. *Indignation* is that *grief* which conſiſteth in the conception of *good ſucceſs* happening to them whom they think *unworthy* thereof. Seeing therefore men think all thoſe unworthy whom they hate, they think them not onely unworthy of the good fortune they have, but

alſo of their own vertues. And of all the Paſſions of the Minde, theſe two, Indignation and Pity, are moſt raiſed and increaſed by Eloquence: for, the *aggravation* of *the calamity*, and *extenuation* of the *fault*, augmenteth *Pity*; and the *extenuation* of the *worth* of the perſon, together with the magnifying of his ſucceſs, which are the parts of an Orator, are able to turn theſe two Paſſions into *Fury*.

12. *Emulation* is *grief* ariſing from ſeeing *ones ſelf exceeded* or excelled by his *concurrent*, together with *hope* to *equal* or exceed him in time to come, by his own ability. But, *Envie* is the ſame *grief* joyned with *pleaſure* conceived in the imagination of ſome *ill* fortune that may befal him.

13. There is a Paſſion that hath

hath *no name*; but the ſi ne of it is that diſtortion of the countenance which we call *Laughter*, which is always *Joy*: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it conſiſteth in *Wit*, or, as they call it, in the *Jeſt*, experience *confuteth*: for men laugh at miſchances and indecencies, wherein there lieth no wit nor jeſt at all. And foraſmuch as the ſame thing is no more ridiculous when it groweth ſtale or uſual, whatſoever it be that moveth laughter, it muſt be *new* and *unexpected*. Men laugh often (eſpecially ſuch as are greedy of applauſe from every thing they do well) at their *own* actions performed never ſo little beyond their own expectations; as alſo at their own *jeſts*: And in this caſe it is manifeſt, that 9.

the Paſſion of Laughter proceedeth from a *ſudden conception* of ſome *ability* in himſelf that laugheth. Alſo men laugh at the *infirmities* of others, by compariſon wherewith their own abilities are ſet off and illuſtrated. Alſo men laugh at *Jeſts*, the *wit* whereof always conſiſteth in the elegant *diſcovering* and conveying to our mindes ſome *abſurdity* of *another*: And in this caſe alſo the Paſſion of Laughter proceedeth from the *ſudden* imagination of our own oddes and eminency: for what is elſe the recommending of our ſelves to our own good opinion, by compariſon with another mans infirmity or abſurdity? For when a jeſt is broken upon our ſelves, or friends of whoſe diſhonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude,

clude, that the Paſſion of Laughter is nothing elſe but *ſudden glory* ariſing from ſome ſudden *conception* of ſome *eminency* in our ſelves, by *compariſon* with the *infirmity* of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themſelves paſt, when they come ſuddenly to remembrance, except they bring with them any preſent diſhonour. It is no wonder therefore that men take hainouſly to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. Laughing *without offence*, muſt be at *abſurdities* and infirmities *abſtracted* from perſons, and when all the company may laugh together: for, laughing to ones ſelf putteth all the reſt into jealouſie, and examination of themſelves. Beſides, it is vainglory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of 9.

another ſufficient matter for his Triumph.

14. The Paſſion oppoſite hereunto, (whoſe ſignes are another diſtortion of the face with tears) called *Weeping*, is the *ſudden falling out with* our ſelves, or ſudden conception of defect; and therefore *children* weep often: for ſeeing they think that every thing ought to be given them which they deſire, of neceſſity every repulſe muſt be a check of their expectation, and puts them in minde of their too much weakneſs to make themſelves maſters of all they look for. For the ſame cauſe *Women* are more apt to weep then men, as being not onely more accuſtomed to have their wills, but alſo to meaſure their powers by the power and love of others that protect them. Men are apt to weep

that

that profecute Revenge, when the revenge is ſuddenly ſtopt or fruſtrated by the repentance of their adverſary; and ſuch are the tears of *reconciliation*. Alſo revengeful men are ſubject to this Paſſion upon the beholding thoſe men they pity, and ſuddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in men proceedeth for the moſt part from the ſame cauſe it proceededeth from in women and children. 9.

15. The appetite which men call *Luſt*, and the fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is a *Senſual* pleaſure, but *not onely* that; there is in it alſo a delight of the minde: for it conſiſteth of two appetites together, to *pleaſe*, and to *be pleaſed*; and the delight men take in delighting, is not Senſual, but a pleaſure or joy of the minde conſiſting

ſiſting in the imagination of the power they have ſo much to pleaſe. But the name *Luſt* is uſed where it is condemned; otherwiſe it is called by the general word *Love* : for the Paſſion is one and the ſame indefinite deſire of different Sex, as natural as Hunger.

16. Of *Love*, by which is underſtood the joy man taketh in the fruition of any *preſent* good, hath been already ſpoken of in the firſt Section, Chap. 7. under which is contained the *love* men bear to one *another*, or pleaſure they take in one anothers company, and by men are ſaid to be ſociable by which nature. But there is another kinde of Love, which the Greeks call ἔρως, and is that which we mean, when we ſay that a man is in love: Foraſmuch as this Paſſion cannot be without diverſity of

of Sex, it cannot be denied but that it *participateth* of that indefinite *Love* mentioned in the former Section. But there is a great difference betwixt the desire of a man *indefinite*, and the same desire *limited ad hunc*; and this is that *Love* which is the great Theme of Poets: But notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word *need*: for it is a conception a man hath of his need of *that one person* desired. The cause of this Passion is *not* always *nor* for the most part *Beauty*, or other quality in the beloved, unless there be withal *hope* in the person that loveth: which may be gathered from this, that in great difference of persons, the *greater* have often faln in love with the *meaner*; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better 9.

for-

fortune in love, whoſe hopes are built upon ſomething *in their perſon*, then thoſe that truſt to their *expreſſions* and *ſervice*; and they that *care leſs*, then they that *care more*: which not perceiving, many men caſt away their ſervices, as one arrow after another, till, in the end, together with their hopes, they loſe their wits.

17. There is yet another Paſſion ſometimes called *Love*, but more properly *good Will* or *Charity*. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, then to finde himſelf able not onely to accompliſh his own deſires, but alſo to *aſſiſt* other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein conſiſteth *Charity*. In which, firſt, is contained that *natural affection* of Parents to their Children, which the *Greeks* call στοργη, as

also, that affection wherewith men seek to *assist* those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on *strangers*, is not to be called Charity, but either *Contract*, whereby they seek to purchase friendship: or *Fear*, which maketh them to purchase peace. The opinion of *Plato* concerning honourable Love, delivered according to his custom in the person of *Socrates*, in the Dialogue intituled *Convivium*, is this, That a man full and pregnant with wisdom and other vertues, naturally seeketh out some beautiful person, of age and capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual respects, ingender and produce the like. And this is the *Idea* of the then-noted *love* of *Socrates* wise and continent, to *Alcibiades* young 9.

and

and beautiful: In which, love is not the ſought honour, but the iſſue of his knowledge; contrary to the common Love, to which though iſſue ſometimes follows, yet men ſeek not that, but to pleaſe, & to be pleaſed. It ſhould be therefore this Charity, or deſire to aſſiſt and advance others. But why then ſhould the wiſe ſeek the ignorant, or be more charitable to the beautiful then to others? There is ſomething in it ſavouring of the uſe of that time: in which matter though *Socrates* be acknowledged for continent, yet the *continent* have the paſſion they *contain*, as *much* and more then they that *ſatiate* the appetite; which maketh me ſuſpect this *Platonick* love for meerly ſenſual; but with an honourable pretence for the Old to haunt the company of the young and beautiful.

18. For-

18. Foraſmuch as all *Knowledge* beginneth from *experience*, therefore alſo *new experience* is the beginning of *new knowledge*, and the increaſe of experience the beginning of the increaſe of knowledge. Whatſoever therefore happeneth new to a man, giveth him matter of *hope* of *knowing* ſomewhat that he knew *not before*. And this hope and expectation of future knowledge from any thing that happeneth new and ſtrange, is that paſſion which we commonly call *Admiration*; and the ſame conſidered as appetite, is called *Curioſity*, which is appetite of Knowledge. As in the diſcerning of faculties, *man leaveth* all community with *beaſts* at the faculty of *impoſing names*; ſo alſo doth he ſurmount their nature at this *Paſſion* of *Curioſity*: For when a 9

Beaſt

Beast seeth any thing new and strange to him, he considereth it so far onely as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth neerer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas Man, who in most events remembreth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the cause and beginning of every thing that ariseth new unto him. And from this Passion of Admiration and Curiosity, have arisen not onely the invention of Names, but also supposition of such Causes of all things as they thought might produce them. And from this beginning is derived all *Philosophy*; as *Astronomy* from the admiration of the course of Heaven, *Naturall Philosophy* from the strange effects of the Elements and other Bodies. And from the degrees of

of Curiosity, proceed also the degrees of Knowledge amongst men: For, to a man in the chase of Riches or Authority, (which in respect of Knowledg are but Sensuality) it is a diversity of little pleasure, whether it be the motion of the Sun or the Earth that maketh the Day, or to enter into other contemplations of any strange accident, then whether it conduce or not to the end he pursueth. Because *Curiosity* is *delight*, therefore also *novelty* is so, but especially that novelty from which a man conceiveth an *opinion* true or false of *bettering* his own estate: for, in such case, they stand affected with the hope that all Gamesters have while the Cards are shuffling. 9.

16. Divers other Passions there be, but they want names: whereof some nevertheless have been

been by moſt men obſerved: For Example; from what Paſſion proceedeth it, that men take *pleaſure* to *behold* from the ſhore the *danger* of them that are at Sea in a tempeſt; or in Fight, or from a ſafe Caſtle to behold two Armies charge one to another in the field? It is certainly, in the whole ſum, *Joy*; elſe men would never flock to ſuch a ſpectacle. Nevertheleſs there is in it both *Joy* and *Grief*: for as there is novelty and remembrance of our own Security preſent, which is *delight*: ſo there is alſo *Pity*, which is Grief: But the Delight is ſo far predominant, that men uſually are content in ſuch a caſe to be ſpectators of the miſery of their friends.

20. *Magnanimity* is no more then *Glory*, of the which I have ſpoken in the firſt Section; but

Glory

Glory well grounded upon certain experience of a power ſufficient to attain his end in open manner. And *Puſillanimity* is the *doubt* of that. Whatſoever therefore is a ſigne of *Vain glory*, the ſame is alſo a ſigne of *Puſillanimity*: for ſufficient power maketh glory a ſpur to ones end. To be *pleaſed* or *diſpleaſed* with *Fame true* or *falſe*, is a *ſigne* of that ſame, becauſe he that relieth on Fame hath not his ſucceſs in his own power. Likewiſe *Art* and *Fallacy* are ſignes of Puſillanimity, becauſe they depend not upon our own power, but the ignorance of others. Alſo *proneneſs* to *anger*, becauſe it argueth difficulty of proceeding. Alſo *oſtentation* of *anceſtors*, becauſe all men are more inclined to make ſhew of their own power when they have it, then of anothers. 9.

thers. To be at *enmity* and contention with *inferiours*, is a ſigne of the ſame, becauſe it proceedeth from want of power to end the war. To *laugh* at others, becauſe it is an affectation of glory from other mens infirmities, and not from any ability of their own. Alſo *irreſolution*, which proceedeth from want of power enough to contemn the little difficulties that make deliberations hard.

21. The compariſon of the life of man to a Race, though it hold not in every part, yet it holdeth ſo well for this our purpoſe, that we may thereby both ſee and remember almoſt all the Paſſions before mentioned. But this *Race* we muſt ſuppoſe to have no other *Goal*, nor other *Garland*, but being formoſt, and in it.

To

9.

To endeavour, is *Appetite.*
To be remiſs, is *Senſuality.*
To conſider them behinde, is *Glory.*
To conſider them before, is *Humility.*
To loſe ground with looking back, *Vain glory.*
To be holden, *Hatred.*
To turn back, *Repentance.*
To be in breath, *Hope.*
To be weary, *Deſpair.*
To endevour to overtake the next, *Emulation.*
To ſupplant or overthrow, *Envie.*
To reſolve to break thorow a ſtop foreſeen, *Courage.*
To break thorow a ſudden ſtop, *Anger.*
To break thorow with eaſe, *Magnanimity.*
To loſe ground by little hinderances, *Puſillanimity.*

To

To fall on the ſudden, is diſpoſition to *weep.*
To ſee another fall, is diſpoſition to *laugh.*
To ſee one out-gone whom we would not, is *Pity.*
To ſee one out-goe whom we would not, is *Indignation.*
To hold faſt by another, is to *love.*
To carry him on that ſo holdeth, is *Charity.*
To hurt ones ſelfe for haſt, is *Shame.*
Continually to be out-gone, is *Miſery.*
Continually to out-go the next before, is *Felicity.*
And to forſake the courſ, is to *die.*

CHAP. X.

HAving ſhewed in the precedent Chapters, that Senſe pro-

proceedeth from the action of external objects upon the *brain*, or ſome internal *ſubſtance* of the *head*; and that the *Paſſions* proceed from the alteration there made, and continued to the *heart*: It is conſequent in the next place, ſeeing the diverſity of degrees in Knowledg in divers men, to be greater then may be aſcribed to the divers *tempers* of their brain, to declare *what other cauſes* may produce ſuch *oddes* and exceſs of *capacity* as we daily obſerve in one man above another. As for that difference which ariſeth from *ſickneſs*, and ſuch accidental diſtempers, I omit the ſame, as impertinent to this place, and conſider, it onely in ſuch as have their *health*, and *organs* well diſpoſed. If the difference were in the naturall temper of the Brain I can imagine no reaſon why

why the ſame ſhould not appear firſt & moſt of all in the Senſes, which being equal both in the wiſe and leſs wiſe, infer an equal temper in the common Organ (namely the Brain) of all the Senſes.

2. But we ſee by experience, that *Joy* and *Grief* proceed *not* in *all* men from the *ſame cauſes*, and that men differ very much in the conſtitution of the body; whereby, that which helpeth and furthereth *vital conſtitution* in one, and is therefore delightful, hindereth it & croſſeth it in another, and therefore cauſeth Grief. The *difference* therefore of *Wits* hath its original *from* the *different paſſions*, and from the *ends* to which the appetite leadeth them.

3. And firſt, thoſe men whoſe ends are *ſenſual* delight, and generally are addicted to *eaſe*, *food*,

food, onerations and *exonerations* of the body, must needs be the *less* thereby delighted with those *imaginations* that *conduce not* to those ends, such as are imaginations of *honour* and *glory*, which, as I have said before, have respect to the future: for Sensuality consisteth in the pleasure of the Senses, which please onely for the present, and take away the inclination to observe such things as conduce to Honour, and consequently maketh men less curious, and less ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to Knowledge or other power: in which two consisteth all the excellency of power cognitive. And this is it which men call *dulness*, and proceedeth from the appetite of sensual or bodily delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such Passion hath its beginning

from a *groſneſs* and *difficulty* of the *motion* of the *ſpirit* about the *heart.*

4. The contrary hereunto, is that *quick ranging* of minde deſcribed, Chap. 4. Sect. 3. which is joyned with *curioſity* of comparing the things that come into the minde one with another: in which compariſon, a man delighteth himſelf either with finding unexpected *ſimilitude* of things, otherwiſe much unlike, in which men place the excellency of *Fancie*, and from whence proceed thoſe grateful Similies, Metaphors, and other Tropes, by which both *Poets* and *Orators* have it in their power to make things pleaſe or diſpleaſe, and ſhew well or ill to others, as they like themſelves; or elſe in diſcerning ſuddenly *diſſimilitude* in things hat otherwiſe appear the ſame.

And

And this vertue of the minde is that by which men attain to exact and perfect *Knowledge*; and the pleasure thereof consisteth in continual instruction, and in distinction of places, persons, and seasons, and is commonly termed by the name of *Judgement*: for, to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: And both *Fancie* and *Judgement* are commonly comprehended under the name of *Wit*, which seemeth to be a Tenuity and Agility of Spirits, contrary to that restinass of the Spirits supposed in those that are dull. 10.

5. There is another defect of the Minde, which men call *Levity*, which betrayeth also *mobility* in the spirits, but in excess. An Example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious discourse, have their mindes di-

verted to every little Jeſt, or witty Obſervation; which maketh them depart from their diſcourſe by Parentheſis, and from that Parentheſis by another, till at length they either loſe themſelves, or make their narration like a dream, or ſome ſtudied Nonſence. The Paſſion from whence this proceedeth, is *Curioſity*, but with *too much equality* and indifference: for when all things make equal impreſſion and delight, they equally throng to be expreſſed.

6. The Vertue oppoſite to this Defect, is *Gravity*, or ſteadineſs; in which the end being the great and maſter-delight, directeth and keepeth in the way thereto all other thoughts.

7. The *extremity* of dulneſs is that *natural folly* which may be called *Stolidity*: But the extreme of *Levity*, though it be natural

natural folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every mans observation, I know *not* how to call it. 10.

8. There is a fault of the Minde called by the Greeks ἀμαθία, which is *Indocibility*, or *difficulty* of being taught; the which must needs arise from a *false opinion* that they *know already* the truth of that is called in question: for certainly men are not otherwise so unequal in cãpacity as the *evidence* is unequal between what is taught by the Mathematicians, and what is commonly dicourſed of in other Books: and therefore if the Minde of men were all of white paper, they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right method, and by right Ratiocination delivered to them: But when men have

once aquieſced in untrue opinions, and regiſtred them as authentical Records in their mindes, it is no leſs impoſſible to ſpeak intelligibly to ſuch men, then to write legibly upon a paper already ſcribled over. The immediate *cauſe* therefore of *Indocibility*, is *prejudice*; and of prejudice, falſe opinion of our own knowledge.

9. Another, and a principal defect of the Minde, is that which men call *Madneſs*, which appeareth to be nothing elſe but ſome *imagination* of ſome ſuch *predominancy* above the *reſt*, that we have *no paſſion but from it*; and this conception is nothing elſe but exceſſive *vain glory*, or *vain dejection*: which is moſt probable by theſe Examples following, which proceed in appearance every one of them from *Pride*, or ſome *dejection* of minde.

minde. As firſt, we have had the example of one that preached in *Cheapſide* from a Cart there, in ſtead of a Pulpit, that he himſelf was Chriſt, which was *ſpiritual* pride or madneſs. We have had alſo divers Examples of Learned Madneſs, in which men have manifeſtly been diſtracted upon any occaſion that hath put them in remembrance of their own ability. Amongſt the learned men, may be remembred (I think alſo) thoſe that determine of the time of the worlds end, and other ſuch the points of Prophecie. And gallant madnes of *Don Quixotte* is nothing elſe but an expreſſion of ſuch height of vain glory as reading of *Romance* may produce in puſillanimous men. Alſo rage and madne's of Love are but great indi; nations of them in whoſe brains is predo- 10.

minant contempt from their enemies, or their Mistresses. And the *pride* taken in *form* and *behaviour*, hath made divers men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the name of Fantastick.

10. And as these are the Examples of extremities, so also are there Examples too many of the degrees, which may therefore be well accounted Follies; as it is a degree of the *first*, for a man, without certain evidence, to think himself to be *inspired*, or to have any other effect of Gods holy Spirit then other godly men have. Of the *second*, for a man continually to speak his minde in a *cento* of other mens Greek or Latine sentences. Of the *third*, much of the present gallantry in love & duel. Of *rage*, a degree is *Malice*; and of *Fantastick* madness, *Affection*.

11. As

11. As the former examples exhibit to us madneſs, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from the exceſs of ſelf-opinion; ſo alſo there be other Examples of Madneſs, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from *too much vain fear* and *dejection*; as in thoſe melancholy men that have imagined themſelves brittle as glaſs, or have had ſome other like imagination: and degrees hereof are all thoſe exorbitant and cauſleſs fears which we commonly obſerve in melancholy perſons.

CHAP. XI.

HItherto of the knowledge of things *natural*, and of

the Paſſions that ariſe naturally from them. Now foraſmuch as we give Names not onely to things natural, but alſo to *ſupernatural*; and by all Names we ought to have ſome meaning and conception: It followeth in the next place, to conſider what thoughts and imaginations of the minde we have, when we take into our mouthes the moſt bleſſed name of GOD, and the names of thoſe *vertues* we attribute unto him; as alſo, what *image* cometh into the minde at hearing the name of *Spirit*, or the name of *Angel*, good or bad.

2. And forasmuch as God Almighty is *incomprehenſible*, it followeth, that we can have *no* conception or *image* of the *Deity*, and conſequently, all *his attributes* ſignifie our *inability* and defect of power to *conceive* any

any thing concerning his Nature, and not any conception of the ſame, excepting onely this, that *there is a God*: For the effects we acknowledge naturally, do include a Power of their producing, before they were produced; and that Power preſuppoſeth ſomething exiſtent that hath ſuch power: And the thing ſo exiſting with power to produce, if it were not Eternal, muſt needs have been produced by ſomewhat before it, and that again by ſomething elſe before that, till we come to an Eternal (that is to ſay, the firſt) Power of all Powers, and firſt Cauſe of all cauſes: And this is it which all men conceive by the Name of GOD, implying Eternity, Incomprehenſibility, and Omnipotency. And thus all that will conſider, may know *that* God is, though *not what* he is, even 11.

even as a man that is born blind, though it be not poſſible for him to have any imagination what kinde of thing Fire is, yet he cannot but know that ſomewhat there is that men call Fire, becauſe it warmeth him.

2. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty *ſeeing*, *hearing*, *ſpeaking*, *knowing*, *loving*, and the like, by which names we underſtand ſomething in *men* to whom we attribute them, we underſtand *nothing* by them in the Nature of God: for, as it is well reaſoned, *Shall not the God that made the eye, ſee*; *and the ear*, *hear*? ſo it is alſo, if we ſay, Shall God, which made the eye, not ſee without the eye; or that made the ear, not hear without the ear; or that made the brain, not know without the brain; or that made the heart, not love without

out the heart? The *attributes* 11
therefore given unto the *Deity*, are such as *signifie* either *our incapacity* or our *reverence*: Our incapacity, when we say Incomprehensible and Infinite; our reverence, when we give him those names which amongst us are the names of those things we most magnifie and commend, as, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Just, Merciful, *&c.* And when God Almighty giveth those names to himself in the Scriptures, it is but ἀνθρωποπαθῶς, that is to say, by descending to our manner of speaking; without which, we are not capable of understanding him.

4. By the name of *Spirit*, we understand a *body natural*, but of such *subtilty*, that it worketh not upon the Senses; but that filleth up the place which the image of a visible body might

fill

fill up. Our conception therefore of Spirit consisteth of *figure without colour*; and in figure is understood dimension, and consequently, to conceive a Spirit, is to conceive something that hath dimension. But *Spirits supernatural* commonly signifie some *substance without* dimension; which two words do flatly contradict one another: and therefore when we attribute the name of Spirit unto God, we attribute it not as the name of any thing we conceive, no more then we ascribe unto him Sense and Understanding; but, as a signification of our reverence, we desire to abstract from him all corporal grosness.

5. Concerning other things, which some men call *Spirits incorporeal*, and some *corporeal*, it is not *possible* by *natural* means onely, to come to *knowledge* of so

so much, as that *there are such* 11.
things. We that are Christians *acknowledge* that there be Angels good and evil, and that there are Spirits, and that the soul of man is a Spirit, and that those Spirits are immortal: *but*, to *know* it, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it is *impossible*: for, all *evidence* is *conception*, as it is said, Chap. 6. Sect. 3. and all conception is *imagination*, and proceedeth from *Sense*, Chap. 3. Sect. 1. And *Spirits* we suppose to be those substances which work *not* upon the *Sense*; and therefore not conceptible. But though the Scripture acknowledge Spirits, yet doth it no where say, that they are incorporeal, meaning thereby, without dimension and quality: Nor, I think, is that word Incorporeal at all in the Bible; but it is said of the Spirit,

rit, that it abideth in men; ſometimes that it dwelleth in them, ſometimes that it cometh on them, that it deſcendeth, and goeth, and cometh; and that Spirits are Angels, that is to ſay, Meſſengers: all which words do imply *locality*; and locality is *dimenſion*; and whatſoever hath dimenſion, is *body*, be it never ſo ſubtil. To me therefore it ſeemeth, that the Scripture favoureth them more, who hold Angels and Spirits corporeal, then them that hold the contrary. And is it a plain *contradiction* in natural diſcourſe, to ſay of the ſoul of man, that it is *tota in toto*, *& tota in qualibet parte corporis*, grounded neither upon Reaſon nor Revelation, but proceeding from the ignorance of what thoſe things are which are called *Spectra*, images that appear in the dark to children,

dren, & such as have strong fears, and other strange imaginations, as hath been said, Chap. 3. Sect. 5. where I call them Phantasms: For, taking them to be things real, without us, like bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike to bodies; what could they call them else, but *incorporeal bodies*? which is no t a name, but an absurdity of speech, 11.

6. It is true, that the Heathens, and all Nations of the world, have acknowledged that there be *Spirits*, which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal; whereby it might be thought, that a man by natural reason, may arrive, without the Scriptures, to the knowledge of this, *That Spirits are*: But the erroneous collection thereof by the Heathens, may proceed, as I have said before, from the ignorance

norance of the cauſe of Ghoſts and Phantaſms, and ſuch other apparitions. And from thence had the Grecians their number of Gods, their number of *Dæmons* good or bad, and for every man his *Genius*; which is not the acknowledging of this truth, *That Spirits are*, but a falſe opinion concerning the force of Imagination.

7. And ſeeing the *knowledge* we have of *Spirits*, is *not natural* knowledge, but *faith* from ſupernatural revelation given to the holy writers of the Scriptures; it followeth, that of Inſpirations alſo, which is the operation of Spirit in us, the knowledge which we have muſt all proceed from Scripture. The *ſignes* there ſet down of *inſpiration*, are *Miracles*, when they be great, and manifeſtly above the power of men to do by impoſture:

ſture: As for Example, the in- II.
ſpiration of *Elias* was known by the miraculous burning of the Sacrifice. But the *ſignes* to *diſtinguiſh* whether a *Spirit* be *good* or *evil*, are the ſame by which we diſtinguiſh whether a man or a tree be good or evil, namely, *actions* and *fruit*: For there are *lying* Spirits, wherewith men are inſpired ſometimes, as well as with *Spirits of truth*. And we are commanded in Scripture to judge of the Spirits by their Doctrine and not of the Doctrine by the Spirits. For Miracles, our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our faith by them, *Matth.* 24. 24. And Saint *Paul* ſaith, *Gal.* 1. 8. *Though an angel from heaven preach to you otherwiſe*, &c. *let him be accurſed*. Where it is plain, that we are not to judge whether the Doctrine be true or not, by the Angel;

Angel; but whether the Angel say true or no, by the Doctrine. So likewise, 1 *Joh.* 4.1. *Believe not every spirit: for false prophets are gone out into the world.* Vers. 2. *Hereby shall ye know the Spirit of God.* Vers. 3. *Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God: and this is the spirit of Antichrist.* Vers. 15. *Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God.* The *knowledge* therefore we have of *good* and *evil* inspiration, cometh *not* by *vision* of an Angel that may teach it, *nor* by a *Miracle* that may seem to confirm it; *but* by *conformity* of Doctrine with this Article and Fundamental Point of Christian Faith, which also Saint *Paul* saith is the sole Foundation, *That Jesus Christ is come in the flesh,* 1 Cor. 3. 11.

8. But

8. But if *Inſpiration* be diſcerned by *this* Point, and *this* Point be acknowledged and believed upon the *authority* of the *Scriptures*; *How* (may ſome men ask) know we that the *Scripture deſerveth* ſo great *authority*, which muſt be no leſs then that of the lively voice of God; that is, how we know the *Scriptures* to be the *Word* of *God*? And firſt, it is manifeſt, that if by Knowledge we underſtand Science infallible and natural, as is defined, Chap. 6. Sect. 4. proceeding from Senſe, we cannot be ſaid to know it, becauſe it proceedeth not from the conceptions ingendered by Senſe. And if we underſtand Knowledge as ſupernatural, we cannot have it but by Inſpiration: And of that *Inſpiration* we cannot judge, but by the *Doctrine*: It followeth, that we have not any way, 11.

way, natural or ſupernatural, of the *knowledge* thereof, which can properly be called *Infallible Science* and *Evidence*. It remaineth, that the knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is onely *Faith*, which Faith therefore is alſo by Saint *Paul* defined, *Heb.* 11.1. to be *the evidence of things not ſeen*; that is to ſay, not otherwiſe evident but by Faith: for, whatſoever either is evident by Natural Reaſon, or Revelation ſupernatural, is not called Faith; elſe ſhould not Faith ceaſe, no more then Charity, when we are in heaven; which is contrary to the Doctrine of the Scripture. And, we are *not* ſaid to *believe*, *but* to *know* thoſe things that be *evident*.

9. Seeing then the acknowledgement of Scriptures to be the

the word of God is not evidence, but Faith, & Faith (Chap. 6. Sect. 7.) consisteth in the trust we have of other men; it appeareth plain, that the men so trusted are the holy men of Gods church succeeding one another from the time of those that saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh. Nor doth this imply that God is not the worker or efficient cause of Faith, or that Faith is begotten in man without the Spirit of God: for, all those good opinions which we admit and believe, though they proceed from Hearing, and Hearing from Teaching, both which are natural, yet they are the work of God: for, all the works of Nature are his, and they are attributed to the Spirit of God: As for Example, *Exod.* 28. 3. *Thou shalt speak unto all cunning men, whom I have filled with*

the

the SPIRIT of wisdom, that they may make Aarons garments for his consecration, that he may serve me in the Priests office. Faith therefore wherewith we believe, is the work of the Spirit of God in that sense by which the Spirit of God giveth to one man wisdom and cunning in workmanship more then another, and by which he effecteth also in other points pertaining to our ordinary life; that one man believeth that, which, upon the same grounds, another doth not; and one man reverenceth the opinion and obeyeth the commands of his superiour, and others not.

10. And seeing our Faith that the Scriptures are the Word of God, began from the confidence and trust we repose in the *Church*; there can be no doubt but that their *interpretation* of the

the ſame Scriptures (when any doubt or controverſie ſhall ariſe, by which this Fundamental Point, *That Jeſus Chriſt is come in the fleſh*, may be called in queſtion) is *ſafer* for any man to truſt to, then his *own*, whether *reaſoning* or *ſpirit*, that is to ſay, his own *opinion*. 11.

11. Now concerning mens *affections* to *Godward*, they are not the ſame always that are deſcribed in the Chapter concerning Paſſions. There for to love, is to be delighted with the image or conception of the thing loved; but God is unconceivable: *To love God* therefore, in the Scripture, is to *obey his Commandments*, and to *love one another*. Alſo, to *truſt God*, is different from our *truſting* one *another*: for, when a man truſteth a man, (Chap. 9. Sect. 8.) he layeth aſide his

own endeavours: but if we do so in our trust to God Almighty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him whom we know we disobey? To *Trust* to *God Almighty* therefore, is to *refer* to his *good pleasure* all that is *above our* own power to effect: and this is *all one* with *acknowledging one* onely God, which is the first Commandment. And to trust *in Christ*, is no more but to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamental Article of our Christian Faith: And consequently, to trust, rely, or, as some express it, to cast and roll our selves on Christ, is the same thing with the Fundamental Point of Faith, namely, that *Jesus Christ is the Son of the living God.*

12. To *honour* God internally in the heart, is the same thing with that we ordinarily call honour

nour amongſt men: for it is nothing but the *acknowledging* of his *power*; and the ſignes thereof, the ſame with the ſignes of the honour due to our ſuperiours mentioned Chap. 8. Sect. 6. *viz.* to *praiſe*, to *magnifie*, to *bleſs*; to pray to him, to thank him, to give Oblations and Sacrifices to him, to give attention to his Word, to ſpeak to him in prayer with conſideration, to come into his preſence with humble geſture and in decent manner, and to adorn his Worſhip with magnificence and coſt: and theſe are natural ſignes of our honouring him internally: And therefore the contrary hereof, To neglect prayer, to ſpeak to him *ex tempore*, to come to Church ſlovenly, to adorn the place of his Worſhip worſe then our own houſes, to take up his Name in every idle diſcourſe, 11.

are the manifeſt ſignes of contempt of the Divine Majeſtie. There be other ſignes which are arbitrary; as, to be uncovered, (as we be here) to put off their ſhooes, as *Moſes* at the fiery buſh, and ſome other of that kinde, which in their own nature are indifferent, till, to avoid indecency and diſcord, it be otherwiſe determined by common conſent.

CHAP. XII.

IT hath been declared already, how *external* objects cauſe *conceptions*, and conceptions *appetite* and *fear*, which are the *firſt unperceived beginnings of our actions*: for *either* the actions immediately follow the firſt appetite, as when we do any thing upon a ſudden; *or elſe* to our firſt

first appetite there succeedeth some conception of evil to happen to us by such actions, which is Fear, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that Fear may succeed a new appetite, and to that appetite another fear alternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come between to make it impossible; and so this alternate appetite and fear ceaseth. This *alternate succession of appetite and fear* during all the time the action is in our power to do or not to do, is that we call *Deliberation*; which name hath been given it for that part of the definition wherein it is said that it lasteth so long as the action whereof we deliberate is in our power: for, so long we have liberty to do or not to do; and deliberation signifieth a taking away of our own liberty.

2. *Deliberation* therefore requireth in the action deliberated *two conditions*; one, that it be *future*; the other, that there be *hope* of doing it, or possibility of not doing it: for, *appetite* and *fear* are *expectations* of the future; and there is no expectation of good, without hope; or of evil, without possibility: of *necessaries* therefore there is *no deliberation*. In Deliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called *Will*; *viz.* the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit. It is all one therefore to say *Will*, and *last Will*: for, though a man express his present inclination and appetite concerning the disposing of his goods, by words or writing, yet shall it not be counted his Will, because he hath still liberty to dispose of them otherways: but when death taketh away that liberty,

liberty, then it is his Will. 12.

3. *Voluntary* actions and omiſſions are ſuch as have beginning in the *Will*; all other are *involuntary*, or *mixed voluntary*, ſuch as a man doth upon appetite or fear; *involuntary*, ſuch as he doth by neceſſity of nature, as when he is puſhed, or falleth, and thereby doth good or hurt to another: *mixt*, ſuch as participate of both; as when a man is carried to priſon, going is voluntary, to the priſon is involuntary: The Example of him that throweth his goods out of a ſhip into the ſea, to ſave his perſon, is of an action altogether voluntary; for, there is nothing therein involuntary, but the hardneſs of the choice, which is not his action, but the action of the Windes; what he himſelf doth, is no more againſt his will, then to flee from dan-

ger is againſt the will of him that ſeeth no other means to preſerve himſelf.

4. *Voluntary* alſo are the actions that proceed from ſudden *anger*, or *other* ſudden *appetite* in ſuch men as can diſcern good or evil: for, in them the time precedent *is* to be judged deliberation; for then alſo he deliberateth in what caſes it is good to *ſtrike*, deride, or do any other action proceeding from anger or other ſuch ſudden paſſion.

5. *Appetite*, *fear*, *hope*, and the reſt of the Paſſions are *not* called *voluntary*; for they proceed *not from*, *but are the Will*, and the Will is not voluntary: for, a man can no more ſay he will will, then he will will will, and ſo make an infinite repetition of the word *will*; which is abſurd, and inſignificant.

6. Foraſmuch

6. Forasmuch as *will to do* is *Appetite*, and *will to omit*, *Fear*; the *cause* of *appetite* and *fear* is the *cause* also of our *will*: But the propounding of the benefits and of harms, that is to say, of Reward and punishment, is the cause of our Appetite, and of our Fears, and therefore also of our Wills, so far forth as we believe that such rewards and benefits as are propounded, shall arrive unto us; and consequently, our *wills* follow our *opinions*, as our *actions* follow our *wills*; in which sense they say truely and properly, that say the World is governed by opinion. 12.

7. When the Wills of many concur to one and the same action and effect, this *concourse* of their *Wills* is called *Consent*; by which we must not understand one will of many men (for every man hath his several Will),

but many Wills to the producing of one effect: But when the *Wills* of two divers men *produce* such actions as are reciprocally *resistant* one to the other, this is called *Contention*; and, being upon the persons one of another, *Battell*: whereas actions proceeding from *Consent*, are mutual *Aid*.

8. When many Wills are involved or included in the Will of one or more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared) then is that involving of many Wills in one or more, called *Union*.

9. In *Deliberations* interrupted, as they may be by *diversion* of other business, or by *Sleep*, the last *appetite* of such part of the deliberation is called *Intention*, or *Purpose*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

HAving ſpoken of the powers and acts of the Minde, both cognitive and motive, conſidered in every man by *himſelf*, *without relation to others*; it will fall fitly into *this* Chapter, to ſpeak of the effects of the ſame power *one upon another*; which effects are alſo the ſignes, by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intendeth. Of theſe ſignes, *ſome* are ſuch as *cannot* eaſily be *counterfeited*; as actions and geſtures, eſpecially if they be ſudden, whereof I have mentioned ſome; (for Example, look in Chap. 9.) with the ſeveral Paſſions whereof they are ſignes: *others* there are which *may* be *counterfeited*, and thoſe

are

are *words* or *ſpeech*; of the uſe and effects whereof, I am to ſpeak in this place.

2. The firſt uſe of Language, is the *expreſſion* of our *conceptions*, that is, the begetting in one another the ſame conceptions that we have in our ſelves; and this is called *Teaching*; wherein, if the *conception* of him that teacheth continually accompany his words, *beginning* at ſomething true in *experience*, then it begetteth the like evidence in the hearer that underſtandeth them, and maketh him to *know* ſomething, which he is therefore ſaid to *learn*: but if there be *not ſuch evidence*, then ſuch teaching is called *Perſwaſion*, and begetteth no more in the hearer, then what is in the ſpeakers bare *opinion*. And the *ſignes* of two opinions contradictory one to another, namely,

Affir-

Affirmation and *Negation* of 13
the ſame thing, is called *Controverſie*: but *both affirmations*, or *both negations*, *Conſent in opinion.*

3. The *infallible* ſigne of *teaching exactly*, and without errour, is this, that *no man* hath *ever taught* the *contrary*: Not that few, how few ſoever, if any; for commonly Truth is on the ſide of a few, rather then of the multitude: But when in opinions and queſtions conſidered and diſcuſſed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the men that ſo diſcuſs'd them differ from another, then it may be juſtly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwiſe they do not. And this appears moſt manifeſtly to them that have conſidered the divers Subjects wherein they have exerciſed their Pens, and

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the divers wayes in which they have proceeded, together with the diversity of the success thereof: for, those men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the comparison of *magnitudes*, *numbers*, *times*, and *motions*, and how their proportions are to one another, have thereby been the Authors of all those excellencies by which we differ from such savage people as now inhabit divers places in *America*; and as have been the inhabitants heretofore of those Countries where at this day Arts and Sciences do most flourish: for, from the studies of these men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for ornament by *Navigation*, and whatsoever we have beneficiall to humane society by the *division*, *distinction*, and *portraicting the face of the earth*; whatsoever

ever also we have by the *account of times*, and *foresight of the course of heaven*; whatsoever by *measuring distances, plains*, and *solides* of all sorts; and whatsoever either *elegant* or *defensible* in *building*: all which supposed a way, what do we differ from the wildest of the *Indians*? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was *any controversie* concerning any conclusion in this Subject; the science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the conclusions of most difficult and profound Speculation. The *reason* whereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their Writings; for they proceed from most *lowe* and *humble* principles, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on *slowly*, and with most *scrupulous Ratiocination*; *viz.* from 13

from the impoſition of Name,s they infer the truth of their *firſt* Propoſitions; and from two of the firſt, a *third*; and from any two of the three, a *fourth*; and ſo on, according to the ſteps of Science mentioned Chap. 6. Sect. 4. On the other ſide, thoſe men who have written concerning the Faculties, Paſſions, and Manners of men, that is to ſay; of *Moral Philoſophy*, and of *Policy*, *Government*, and *Laws*, whereof there be infinite Volumnes, have been ſo *far from removing doubt* and controverſie in the Queſtions they have handled, *that* they have very much *multiplied the ſame*: *Nor* doth any man at this day ſo much as pretend to *know* more then hath been delivered Two thouſand years ago by *Ariſtotle*: and yet every man thinks, that in this Subject he knoweth as much

much as any other; ſuppoſing there needeth thereunto no ſtudie but that accrueth unto them by natural wit; though they play, or imploy their minde otherwiſe in the purchaſe of wealth or place. The reaſon whereof is no other, then that in their writings and diſcourſes they take for principles thoſe opinions which are already vulgarly received, whether true or falſe, being for the moſt part falſe. There is therefore a great deal of *difference* between *teaching* and *perſwading*; the ſigne of this being *controverſie*; the ſigne of the former, *no controverſie*. 13.

4. There be *two ſorts* of men that commonly be called *learned*: One is that ſort that proceedeth *evidently* from humble principles, as is deſcribed in the laſt Section; and thoſe men

are

are called *Mathematici*: *The other* are they that *take up* Maximes from their *education*, and from the *authority* of men, or of cuſtom, and *take the habitual diſcourſe of the tongue for ratiocination*; and theſe are called *Dogmatici*. Now ſeeing in the laſt Section thoſe we call *Mathematici* are abſolved of the crime of breeding controverſie, and they that pretend not to Learning cannot be accuſed, the fault lieth altogether in the *Dogmaticks*, that is to ſay, thoſe that are imperfectly learned, and with paſſion preſs to have their opinions paſs everywhere for truth, without any evident demonſtration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation.

5. The expreſſion of thoſe conceptions which *cauſe* in us the

the *experience* of good while we deliberate, as alſo of thoſe which cauſe our expectation of evil, is that which we call *counſelling*, and is the internal deliberation of the minde concerning what we our ſelves are to do or not to do. The *conſequences* of our actions are our *counſellers*, by *alternate ſucceſſion* in the minde. So in the counſel which a man taketh from *other* men, the *counſellors alternately* do *make appear the conſequences* of the action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furniſh among them all him that is counſelled with arguments whereupon to deliberate with himſelf. 13

6. Another uſe of Speech is *expreſſion* of *appetite*, *intention*, and *will*; as the appetite of Knowledge by *interrogation*; appetite to have a thing done by

by another, as requeſt, *prayer*, petition: expreſſions of our purpoſe or intention, as *promiſe*, which is the affirmation or negation of ſome action to be done in the future: *threatning*, which is the promiſe of evil; and *commanding*, which is that ſpeech by which we ſignifie to another our *appetite* or deſire *to have* any *thing done*, or *left undone*, for reaſons contained in the will it ſelf: for it is not properly ſaid, *Sic volo, ſic jubeo*, without that other clauſe, *Stet pro ratione voluntas*: And when the command is a ſufficient reaſon to move us to action, then is that Command called a *Law*.

7. Another uſe of Speech is *inſtigation* and appeaſing, by which we increaſe or diminiſh one anothers paſſion: It is the ſame thing with *perſwaſion*; the dif-

difference not being real; for, the begetting of *opinion* and *passion* is the *same*. But whereas in *perswasion* we aim at *getting opinion from passion*; *here*, the end is, *to raise passion from opinion*. And as in raising an opinion from passion, any premises are good enough to inforce the desired Conclusion; so, in raising passion from opinion, it is no matter whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration historicall or fabulous: for, *not* the *truth*, but the *image*, maketh Passion: and a Tragedie, well acted, affecteth no less then a Murther. 13.

8. Though words be the *signes* we have of one anothers *opinions* and intentions, because the *equivocation* of them is so *frequent according* to the *diversity of contexture*, and of the company wherewith they go, which,

which, the presence of him that speaketh, our *sight* of his *actions*, and *conjecture* of his *intentions*, must help to discharge us of; it must therefore be *extreme hard* to finde the *opinions* and meaning of those *men* that are *gone from us long ago*, & have left us no other signification thereof then their Books, which cannot possibly be understood without *History*, to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great prudence to *observe* them.

9. When it happeneth that a man signifieth unto us two *contradictory* opinions, whereof the *one* is *clearly* and directly *signified*, and the *other* either *drawn* from that by *consequence*, or not known to be contradictory to it; then (when he is not present to explicate himself better) we are to take the *former*

mer for his opinion; for that is clearly ſignified to be his, and directly, whereas the other might proceed from errour in the deduction, or ignorance of the repugnancie. The like alſo is to be held in two contradictory expreſſions of a mans intention and will, for the ſame reaſon. 13.

10. Foraſmuch as whoſoever *ſpeaketh* to another, intendeth thereby to *make* him *underſtand* what he ſaith, if he ſpeak unto him either in a Language which he that heareth underſtandeth not, or uſe any word in other ſence then he believeth is the ſence of him that heareth, he *intendeth alſo not* to make him underſtand what he ſaith; which is a *contradiction* of himſelf. It is therefore always to be ſuppoſed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private in-

interpretation of his ſpeech to him to whom it is addreſſed.

11. *Silence*, in him that *believeth* that the ſame ſhall be taken for *a ſigne of his intent*, *is* a ſigne thereof indeed: for, if he did not conſent, the labour of ſpeaking ſo much as to declare the ſame, is ſo little, as it is to be preſumed he would have done it.

Conclusion.

THus have we conſidered the nature of Man ſo far as was requiſite for the finding out the firſt and moſt ſimple elements wherein the compoſitions of Politick Rules and Laws are laſtly reſolved; which was my preſent purpoſe.

FINIS.

Qui facet non vtiq; fatetur
verum est tamen eum non
negare. Justinian. Institut.